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ABSTRACT 
 
Catch shares or Individual Transferable Quotas (ITQs) are economic instruments used 
in fisheries to address common pool problems. They attempt to increase economic 
yield from the fishery by allocating exclusive and secure fishing rights and by 
promoting catch constraints that will lead to stock rebuilding. The catch shares are 
transferable, which results in a market for both sales and temporary leasing of quotas 
within the fishery. Fishers are expected to make their decisions in line with good 
stewardship practices because they benefit from future improvements in the stock, and 
efficiency of harvesting increases as quota is transferred to more efficient operators. 
There is empirical evidence that some successes towards these goals has been achieved 
by ITQs, such as fleet rationalization, however, some issues arise when fishers do not 
behave as expected. Therefore, knowing how fisheries respond to ITQs and how the 
incentives change with changing stock abundances is critical in assisting fisheries 
managers when designing polices. In this thesis the total allowable catch (TAC) setting 
process in Australian and New Zealand ITQ fisheries were analysed to identify factors 
that prevent fishers exercising good stewardship. The Tasmanian rock lobster fishery 
(TRLF) was then used as a case study to analyse the sale and lease quota market. 
Changes in quota transfers and interactions between operators in response to changes 
in stock abundance were assessed. Finally, an experimental economic approach was 
used to assess factors that may promote cooperation when restocking is used as a tool 
to address stock and congestion externalities that result in spatial stock heterogeneity. 
The aim of the thesis was get a higher understanding of factors that may prevent 
expected outcomes emerging from ITQ systems.        
 
A fundamental and expected outcome of ITQ systems is resource stewardship through 
the setting of conservative TACs. This is anticipated to be promoted by increase in 
catch share values that results from higher catch rates, in combination with security 
and exclusivity. Despite most of the analysed fisheries behaving as expected, a non-
trivial fraction consistently showed lack of stewardship, keeping constant and even 
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increasing the TACs when stock status and asset values were trending downward. 
Several reasons were identified as a cause of this behaviour, the most frequent being a 
lack of understanding or acceptance of the principle underlying the ITQ systems. For 
instance, TAC constraints were interpreted as a reduction in profitability which 
indicated no understanding or value placed on the economic benefit of higher future 
catch rates. This analysis showed that despite the fact that stewardship is possible in 
ITQ fisheries, it is not inevitable and additional conditions are required to promote 
stewardship. 
 
Stock abundance can change as a consequence of a lack of stewardship and/or natural 
causes such as recruitment failures. This can potentially be reflected in the quota 
markets, as they are expected to respond to variations in economic rent from the 
fishery. Since the ITQ system was introduced in the TRLF, the stock has shown two 
periods of trends in abundance - a period of stock growth between 1998 and 2006, 
followed by a period of stock decline between 2007 and 2011. These changes affected 
quota markets in the fishery with a trend of increasing activity in the permanent quota 
trade market during the period of stock growth and during both periods in the quota 
lease market. The transfer of quota units was not associated with the operators’ 
technical efficiency (i.e. catching capability) as predicted for ITQ fisheries, but linked 
to their financial capacity (i.e. number of owned quota units). The stock decline 
changed fishers’ behaviour, with those previously active reducing their activity in the 
quota lease market, and those inactive becoming involved in the market, resulting in 
an expanding fleet with more small operators.        
 
Stock abundance changes also affected the lease quota trade network with increased 
interactions during the period of stock growth, which lasted until the second year of 
the period of stock decline. Individuals had greatest level of connection (traded quotas) 
with other fishers at this time, following which the trend reversed as the stock declined. 
The social capital of active operators and position in the lease quota trade network was 
mostly influenced by the fishing operation characteristics, and by quota ownership in 
the case of investors. Different dimensions of social capital influenced the success of 
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operators in the fisher and caused them to modify their trading interactions in response 
to changes in stock abundance. There were some indications of asymmetry in 
bargaining power, such as between small and large quota owners and this relationship 
changed when the stock declined and the lease quota trade market became less 
competitive.   
 
In addition to temporal variations, stock may vary spatially in terms of abundance 
and/or resource quality. ITQ systems do not delineate who can fish in each specific 
patch; therefore, fishers target more profitable areas, which generates stock and 
congestion externalities. An economic experiment was used to assess the effect of 
different factors promoting cooperation, including when restocking was used to 
address stock and congestion externalities and the consequent rent dissipation. When 
policies involved compulsory actions and economic punishment some extent of 
cooperation was reached. The highest level of cooperation occurred when the policy 
design gave the option of choosing between getting involved in the restocking plan or 
not. Nonetheless, evidence showed that the voluntary option should be complemented 
with a measure that provided those individuals who are intrinsically cooperative with 
security that those liable to free-riding are either physically excluded from or punished 
for fishing in the restocked area. When the design only included a voluntary setting, 
free-riders dominated. Thus, depending on signals conveyed by the rules, intrinsically 
cooperative individuals may lead the economic exchanges to an equilibrium of low 
rent dissipation and vice versa. 
 
This research makes a contribution to the discussion of factors that affect fishers’ 
decisions, and how in some cases these decisions prevent expected outcomes of the 
ITQ system. This provides guidance on the design of management policies in the 
context of ITQ systems.   
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Chapter 1  
General Introduction 
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1.1. Right-based management and individual transferable quota 
systems  
Right-based management instruments, such as Individual Transferable Quota (ITQ) 
systems are used in fisheries to pursue economic rationalization and efficiency through 
two main mechanisms. Namely, allocation of private fishing rights to operators and 
through market-based incentives (Wilen 2006).  Under ITQ systems, fishers are 
provided with an exclusive and secure access to catch shares or quota from a Total 
Allowable Catch (TAC) of a given stock. This fishing right is expected to remove 
incentives to compete for fish, because fishers do not need to invest excessive capital 
to maximize catch given the guaranteed catch share. The consequences are fleet 
rationalization and fishing effort reduction, which are expected to improve the fishery 
profitability (Dupont et al. 2002, 2005; Fox et al. 2003, 2006). When TACs are 
soundly set stocks remain abundant or rebuild when they are depleted with a 
subsequent increase of catch per unit of effort (CPUE). Thus economic efficiency is 
gained by minimizing cost and maximizing profit (Arnason 1990; Wilen 2006; 
Costello et al. 2010).   
The market-based incentive of ITQs relates to wealth creation from the traded value 
of catch shares. The market value of these shares is expected to reflect the net present 
value of future cash flows from each catch shares (Wilen 2006). Catch shares are an 
intangible asset and their value (price) should increase in response to higher profits 
such as from lower fishing costs as a consequence of stock rebuilding and higher catch 
rates. Thus, quota price is positively correlated with good management (Batstone and 
Sharp 2003; Newell et al. 2005) and an indirect measure of stock status (Arnason 
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1990). Capitalization is expected to provide incentive for stewardship of resources, 
“Ownership refers to the stewardship incentive that is designed into ITQ systems to 
motivate share owners to care for long-term resource use” (Garrity 2011). However, 
the link between allocation of catch shares and stewardship is rather speculative. In 
fact, in the few attempts to prove this link  the results showed that private rights do not 
necessarily promote stewardship (Gilmour et al. 2011, 2012).   It is clearer that a 
functional market for quota transfers is critical for establishing a link between 
capitalization and stock status. In the presence of functional markets, quotas are 
expected to transit to more efficient operators, and operators who have higher fishing 
costs are expected to exit the fishery with compensation from the quota sale. Thus, the 
market is expected to increase overall fleet efficiency (Branch et al. 2006). 
ITQ systems have had positive outcomes in many fisheries around the world. For 
instance, based on a long time series from a global database of catch statistics, it was 
reported that the stock collapse risk was lower than average in fisheries with ITQ-
based management (Costello et al. 2008). Other outcomes identified following the 
introduction of right-based management include improvement in economic efficiency 
(Pascoe et al. 2011; Grimm et al. 2012); extension in the length of the fishing seasons 
and thus continuity of supply (Casey et al. 1995); and improvement in the quality of 
product (Bonzon et al. 2013). Relaxation of input controls in fisheries with ITQ-based 
management has also led to cost reduction, due to elimination of inefficient controls 
such as catch limits per trip and seasonal closures (Weninger and Waters 2003).   
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Despite these positive outcomes, ITQ systems have also received criticism on the basis 
of ecological, economic and social concerns (Costello et al. 2010). Ecological issues 
include the incentive for high-grading, which results in discard and mortality of lower-
market value fish (Copes 1986), and also concentration of effort into spatial areas 
where product has a higher unit value (Bradshaw 2004). From a socio-economic point 
of view, criticism has been directed at quota concentration (REF), unequal bargaining 
power amongst quota owners and the excessive cost of quota units that creates a barrier 
to new entrants or business expansion  (Pinkerton and Edwards 2009). Finally, 
economic issues emerge if ITQs do not delineate where fishers may harvest; therefore 
they often concentrate their effort on more profitable patches reducing overall 
economic yield from the resource (Boyce 1992). This problem arises because 
competition between individuals remains and may lead to congestion externalities 
such as gear conflict and loss of product quality (Costello and Deacon 2007).  
 
1.2. Individual transferable quota system in the Tasmanian rock 
lobster fishery 
The ITQ system management system was introduced in the Tasmanian rock lobster 
fisher (TRLF) in 1998 in response to declining stock productivity (Bradshaw 2004). 
This declining trend could not be reverted by input control management, as it failed to 
reduce overcapitalization and fishing effort (Ford 2001). The TAC is set annually and 
equally split into 10,507 quota units. These quota units were distributed solely on 
ownership of licences, with no account of catch history. There is no minimum quota 
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ownership, but units can only be fished if associated with a fishing license holding a 
minimum of 15 units with five of these to be owned by the license holder (the 
remainder can be leased in).  There is also a maximum quota-holding limit of 200 units 
designed to prevent concentration of ownership, which is an unusual aspect of the 
quota system in this fishery. Markets for both sale and temporary lease of quota units 
have developed with the number of participants, the number of transactions and the 
connectedness of the market increasing through time (van Putten et al. 2011).  
 
Once the ITQ system was implemented, the fishery went through an initial period of 
stock rebuilding with a trend of increasing biomass and catch rates until 2006. Over 
this period, the TAC was harvested each year, quota lease prices rose (Gardner et al. 
2011) and the fleet reduced in size from 239 active vessels in 2000 down to 203 in 
2007 (Emery et al. 2014a).  These trends reversed from 2007 with biomass and CPUE 
declining as a result of a period of below-average recruitment (Linnane et al. 2010b). 
The TAC was not fully taken in 2009 and catch rate decreased by 34.2% from 2006 to 
2011. This decline in stock resulted in lower lease prices (Gardner et al. 2011), which 
created an incentive for new entrants (lease fishers) and the fleet size increased with 
33 more vessels reporting catch in 2011/12 than in 2006/07 (Hartmann et al. 2013).  
 
1.3. Research objectives and thesis structure  
The overall aim of this research was to carry out a quantitative assessment of the 
strength of the ITQ system, by analysing fishers’ behaviour under conditions of stock 
Chapter 1   General introduction 
6 
 
biomass changes and discussing patterns relative to what may be expected according 
to ITQ theory. 
 
The thesis is organized around four core research chapters and two appendices that 
include two articles additional articles. The candidate is co-author in these additional 
articles based on substantive contribution in the analysis of data, which was a similar 
method and research topic to that dealt with in chapter 5 of this thesis. 
 
According to the economic theory associated with ITQ systems, the allocation of 
exclusive fishing access should create incentives for resource stewardship. It is 
expected that quota owners should support and advocate for TAC constraint in pursuit 
of higher economic yield from the cost reduction that occurs with stock rebuilding and 
higher catch rates. In Chapter 2, the history of TAC setting was explored in several 
ITQ managed coastal fisheries in Australia and New Zealand. The objective was to 
examine whether TACs have been constrained to target higher profitability and thus 
increase asset values as predicted by ITQ theory. When the historical pattern in 
decision-making was not in line with the expected pattern, the potential factors that 
may explain these results were explored.  
 
Transferability of quotas is another component of ITQ systems that is expected to have 
net positive outcomes for the fishery, with the rationale that quotas are expected to 
transit from less to more efficient operators. Quota transition requires a functional 
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market that values future economic yield and this is true for both quota sales and 
temporary quota leasing. Changes in the stock abundance are expected to be reflected 
in the economic rent from the fishery and consequently in the quota markets. The 
dramatic changes in stock productivity that occurred in this fishery provided an 
opportunity to assess the functioning of the ITQ quota market and whether expected 
outputs, such as quota flow to more efficient operators, remained during biomass 
decline (Chapter 3). In Chapter 4, this effect of biomass change was further explored 
in an assessment of the functionality of the lease quota trade market by analysing the 
structure and dynamics of connections amongst operators trading quotas A social 
network analysis approach was used to assess the factors influencing the operators’ 
connectedness and in turn the effect of the connectedness on the market functionality. 
 
ITQ systems have been clearly demonstrated to have success in reducing the so-called 
“race-to-fish” and have been effective in addressing problems of overcapitalization, 
shortened fishing seasons and low quality of product. Nonetheless, other issues and 
problems have emerged, in part because of spatial heterogeneity of resources, such as 
stock and congestion externalities. In the Chapter 5, an experimental economic 
approach was used to assess the potential for cooperative behaviour to reduce 
congestion externalities. This experiment was set in the context of management of a 
stock enhancement program as has been recently developed into a commercial 
operation in the TRLF (Gardner et al. 2015b).    
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2.1. Abstract 
Theoretically, “catch shares” or individual transferable quotas systems (ITQ) are 
expected to provide economic benefits by improving efficiency through fleet 
rationalization and cost reduction as a consequence of removal of race to fish and stock 
rebuilding and higher catch rates when stocks were depleted. Resource stewardship in 
setting conservative total allowable catches (TACs) is thought to be rewarded through 
higher catch share values that result from security and more profitable harvests. This 
paper explores the TAC setting process in several ITQ managed coastal fisheries in 
Australia and New Zealand. It was examined whether TACs have been constrained to 
target higher profitability and thus increase asset values. Most of the analysed fisheries 
made decisions in line with expected behaviour under good stewardship, with this 
behaviour promoted by effective functioning of fishers’ associations. However, a non-
trivial number of fisheries (26%) consistently showed lack of stewardship where the 
disagreement between government and industry remained, with industry continuing to 
lobby for TACs that dissipated rent. Several causes were identified with the most 
pervasive being a lack of understanding/acceptance of the rationale of ITQs systems 
with lower TACs equated with a reduction in profitability.  The divergence between 
theory and reality in these fisheries shows that although stewardship in TAC setting is 
possible and even common, it cannot be entirely relied on ITQ systems and additional 
conditions are required to generate stewardship behaviour.   
 
Key words: Catch share owners, economic and management assumptions, ITQ, rock 
lobster/abalone, stewardship 
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2.2. Introduction 
Individual Transferable Quota (ITQ), or catch share systems, have been implemented 
in many fisheries around the world to constrain catch for biological objectives and in 
an attempt to create economic benefits through reduced competition for fish (Dupont 
et al. 2002; Fox et al. 2003; Costello et al. 2008). The transferable component of ITQ 
systems is intended to shift catch to more efficient operators through market forces 
driven by increasing the value of products and assets (Grafton et al. 2000; Dupont et 
al. 2005). Theoretically, these changes create a more stable, profitable and sustainable 
fishery. 
 
Studies have shown that the risk of stock collapse is reduced with ITQ-based 
management (Costello et al. 2008, 2010) although this is related to the constraint of a 
total allowed catch (TAC) rather than the market-based attributes of ITQs (Bromley 
2009).  Several benefits arising from the tradeable aspect of ITQs have been proposed 
including the use of a market mechanism to promote efficiency through fleet 
rationalization (Dupont et al. 2005).  Trading tends to result in a greater proportion of 
the catch being taken by more efficient operators, which raises the overall economic 
efficiency of the fleet. In the British Columbia halibut fishery, economic efficiency 
increased when the effort dropped as a result of a 28% reduction of vessel 
numbers(Grafton et al. 2000). Aside from vessel numbers, vessel characteristics (such 
as size) can respond to ITQs thus reducing costs and increasing efficiency (Bjørndal 
and Gordon 1993; Pascoe et al. 2011). 
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ITQs are also typically associated with relaxation of input controls such as the length 
of the fishing season, which increases the potential to ‘fish to market’ (Dupont et al. 
2005). In the extreme case of the Alaskan halibut fishery, ITQ implementation led to 
an extension in the season from 24 hours to 200 days. The effect was an increase in 
landing price over of 40% due to the elimination of an over-supply at some times of 
the year (Casey et al. 1995) and because processors were able to supply fresh rather 
than frozen products (Bonzon et al. 2013). Increase in revenue can also be generated 
when intra-seasonal variations in fish characteristics or markets are taken into account 
in fishing programs (Larkin and Sylvia 2004).  The relaxation of input controls (that 
may have been in place before the TAC and ITQs) can also directly affect capacity to 
fish and thus marginal costs of fishing.  In the northern Gulf of Mexico reef fish 
fishery, an ex ante analysis estimated a 75% reduction in harvesting cost as a result of 
elimination of per trip catch limits, seasonal closures and transfer of catch shares to 
more efficient operators (Weninger and Waters 2003).  
 
Although ITQs have been promoted on the basis of these gains in technical efficiency, 
there is also an argument for their use in relation to stock management where the 
constraint of the TAC results in increase in catch rate and thus reduction in cost (Breen 
et al. 2009).  Formally, this process addresses the issue of the stock externality of 
fishing where harvesting reduces subsequent catch rates and thus increases the 
marginal cost of fishing. This means that constraint in catch provides an economic 
benefit.  This economic benefit flows to quota holders and becomes capitalised where 
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quota units or catch shares are allocated to individuals and traded in a market.  Fishers 
are thus rewarded for decisions that increase future cash flows and this is theorised to 
create incentives to set conservative TACs (Gauvin et al. 1994; Brander and Burke 1995; 
Annala 1996; Breen and Kendrick 1997; Fujita et al. 1998; Grafton et al. 2006; Khan 2006; 
Wilen 2006; Yandle 2006b,a) , which is termed stewardship (Wilen 2006).  
 
Resource stewardship by industry is clearly desirable because it reduces political 
conflict over catch setting by aligning sustainability and economic incentives. 
However, not all ITQ systems are equal and details of the system can affect the strength 
of the incentive for stewardship (Eggert and Ulmestrand 2008; Breen et al. 2009).  The 
strength of systems that promote stewardship is thus of interest in terms of incentives 
for stock rebuilding and wealth creation (Hilborn et al. 2005)  
 
The outcome of stewardship is thus central to the argument for implementation of ITQ 
systems. This research explored whether stewardship has been evident in several ITQ 
managed rock lobster and abalone fisheries in Australia and New Zealand.  This 
question was addressed by exploring the TAC setting process, and whether decision-
making has been consistent with the economic theory of ITQs.  More specifically, 
whether TACs have been set in order to increase asset values, and whether 
governments and industry have been able to work cooperatively to set TACs that 
constrain current harvests to target higher profitability. In cases where decision-
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making did not appear to be consistent with stewardship, the reasons for this outcome 
were explored.  
 
2.3. Methods 
This research examined rock lobster (RL), green lip (GL) and black lip (BL) abalone 
fisheries in Australian and New Zealand. Australian fisheries in New South Wales 
(nsw, both RL/BL); South Australia northern zone (sanz, RL); southern zone (sasz, 
RL); central zone black lip stock (saczBL); central zone green lip stock (saczGL); 
southern zone fishing down area black lip stock (saszfdaBL); southern zone non-
fishing down area black lip stock (sasznfdaBL); western zone-A black lip stock 
(sawzaBL); western zone-A green lip stock (sawzaGL); western zone-B black lip stock 
(sawzbBL) and western zone-B green lip stock (sawzbGL); Tasmania (tas, both 
BL/RL); Victoria central zone (viccz, BL); Victoria eastern zone (vicez, both RL/BL) 
and western zone (vicwz, both RL/BL). New Zealand fisheries in Crayfish stocks 1 to 
9 (nzc1 to 9) and Paua (abalone) stocks 1 to 7 (nzp2 to 4, 5A, B, D, and 7). These 
fisheries were selected as they had the longest history of ITQ management in the 
region, were all simple single species fisheries, and are under different jurisdictions. 
 
Stewardship and stock status history 
Historical trends of stock status and asset values were used to check whether the 
expected stewardship from ITQ systems was translated into the TAC setting process. 
Data was obtained from stock assessment reports and from quota traders. To evaluate 
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stewardship, fisheries were classified according their standardized changes in CPUE 
and TAC. Stewardship was assumed to occur when (i) the TAC was increased only 
when the CPUE increased, (ii) when the TAC was reduced in a response to a decrease 
in CPUE, and (iii) when the TAC was reduced when the CPUE remained constant 
and/or decreased (Fig. 2.1).  
 
Figure 2.1. Changes in catch rates (CPUE) versus total allowable catch (TAC) used 
as criteria to classify different fisheries into stewardship or non-stewardship behaviour. 
Example based on Australian rock lobster fisheries in New South Wales (nsw); South 
Australia northern zone (sanz) and southern zone (sasz); Tasmania (tas), Victoria 
eastern zone (vicez) and western zone (vicwz); and New Zealand rock lobster fisheries 
in the management zone Crayfish 1 to 9 (nzc1 to 9). 
 
Lack of stewardship was assumed to occur when (i) the TAC was increased, (ii) kept 
constant or (iii) only slightly reduced when CPUE proportionally dropped more than 
the TAC reduction applied (Fig. 2.1). A third category, labelled as unclear, was added 
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to take into account small declines in CPUE without a reduction in TAC, as could 
occur with a decision rule approach incorporating target and limit reference points. 
Even with stewardship, a CPUE reduction may not be accompanied by a TAC 
reduction if the stock remains above a limit reference point. Consequently CPUE 
decreases of up to 30% without an accompanying TAC change were classified as 
unclear.  In most fisheries TAC decisions are made for the next season using the 
previous season’s data. Consequently a time-delay of two years was considered 
between CPUE changes and the corresponding TAC decision. A lag of two years to 
depict fishery behaviour according to CPUE changes was considered appropriate for 
generalising across fisheries because in most fisheries the TAC is set for the coming 
year during the current season using data from the previous season. Therefore, the 
previous year’s CPUE is the closer reference. 
 
CPUE changes were used to examine whether or not fisheries transitioned to or 
remained in the stewardship state with changes in the stock as measured by the CPUE. 
In the present research the CPUE values were standardized by the mean value of each 
fishery and the CPUE changes assessed were those that occurred after two years (t-2).  
 ���� �ℎ�݊��� =  �����,௧ − �����,௧−ଶ 
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Where �����,௧ is the catch rate of the fishery i at the present and �����,௧−ଶ is the 
catch rate of the same fishery two years ago. Positive values of CPUE Change implied 
that the catch rate increased and vice versa. 
 
Stewardship state changes 
Transitions between the behavioural states of stewardship and non-stewardship were 
analysed using Multistate Markov (MSM) models (Kalbfleisch and Lawless 1985; 
Jackson et al. 2003).  The likelihood of this model was calculated from the transition 
probability matrix  �ሺݑ, ݐ + ݑሻ . Every element ݌௥,௦ሺݑ, ݐ + ݑሻ  of the matrix 
corresponded to the probability of being in the state ݏ at time ݐ + ݑ given the state ݎ 
at timeݑ. The transition probability matrix was obtained using maximum likelihood 
estimation through the R package msm (Jackson 2011). ���� �ℎ�݊�� was used as a 
covariate, and values of transition rates between states were plotted against this 
covariate.  
 
TAC setting process  
The degree of agreement on TAC setting between industry and the fisheries 
management authority was assessed by survey, with 81 researchers, fisheries managers 
and fishers invited to participate. The survey included questions exploring the 
occurrence of disagreement when a reduction of the TAC was required and any 
associated factors. The purpose of this survey was to put into context previously 
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identified factors and avoid to discuss any speculative one and unlikely to happen in 
ITQ managed fisheries. Some factors were gauged by more than one question. For 
instance, the factor Not understanding the ITQ system was assessed by the questions 
that focussed on how quota owners understand TAC reductions and the effect of higher 
catch rates on costs. The survey also focussed on situations where the industry had 
asked for a reduction in the TAC. The survey included Likert-type questions with the 
following ordinal scale (Rainer et al. 2007): not important, minor effect, important, 
very important and most critical factor (Appendix 2.1). To summarize the answers and 
simplify analysis, the five ordinal scale levels were transformed to a binary scale. Thus, 
not important and minor effects were merged into the not important, and important, 
very important and most critical factor were merged into the category of important. 
The proportion of respondents that considered the factors involved in the TAC setting 
process important or not is presented in the summary. The importance of factors 
associated with industry negotiations for a TAC reduction was also determined using 
the binary proportion of responses. .  
 
2.4. Results  
Stewardship and stock status history   
The trends of occurrence of stewardship based on trends in CPUE and TAC revealed 
two patterns, (i) a consistent occurrence of stewardship, and (ii) one where behaviour 
varied between stewardship and non-stewardship (Fig. 2.2).  
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Figure 2.2. Historical trends of occurrence of stewardship / non-stewardship in 
Australian and New Zealand rock lobster (RL), green lip (GL) and black lip (BL) 
abalone fisheries.  Australian fisheries in New South Wales (nsw, both RL/BL); South 
Australia northern zone (sanz, RL); southern zone (sasz, RL); central zone black lip 
stock (saczBL); central zone green lip stock (saczGL); southern zone fishing down 
area black lip stock (saszfdaBL); southern zone non-fishing down area black lip stock 
(sasznfdaBL); western zone-A black lip stock (sawzaBL); western zone-A green lip 
stock (sawzaGL); western zone-B black lip stock (sawzbBL) and western zone-B 
green lip stock (sawzbGL); Tasmania (tas, both BL/RL); Victoria central zone (viccz, 
BL); Victoria eastern zone (vicez, both RL/BL) and western zone (vicwz, both 
RL/BL). New Zealand fisheries in Crayfish stocks 1 to 9 (nzc1 to 9) and Paua (abalone) 
stocks 1 to 7 (nzp2 to 4, 5A, B, D, and 7). 
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Most fisheries that had a consistent pattern of occurrence of stewardship reduced the 
TAC and/or kept it constant even when the CPUE increased. For instance, in the rock 
lobster fishery nzc9 in New Zealand the TAC was reduced in 1991 and kept constant 
at a low level even after a rise in CPUE in 2003 (Fig. 2.3a and b). Stewardship was 
observed in nzc9 throughout the analysed period (Fig. 2.2). Similarly consistent 
stewardship behaviour was evident in the rock lobster fisheries nzc1, nzc5 and nzc6 
(Fig. 2.3a and b); and by abalone fisheries in New Zealand nzp3 to nzp5 and South 
Australia, sawzaBL, saczBL and saczGL (Fig. 2.4a and b). In all these fisheries the 
TAC was not increased even when the CPUE rose.  
 
The pattern of irregular stewardship was a result of a number of different TAC 
decisions. In some fisheries, a reduction in the TAC was applied too slowly after 
decline in CPUE. For instance, in the rock lobster fishery nzc3, the CPUE trended 
down from 1998 to 2004, but the TAC was kept constant until 2005 when the TAC 
was reduced by 58% (Fig. 2.3a and b). A similar situation occurred in other fisheries; 
however, in these fisheries the TAC was more gradually reduced; but this also meant 
that stock rebuilding after a decline took longer. For example, in the South Australian 
rock lobster fishery (sasz) the TAC was kept constant for four years despite a 
decreasing pattern in CPUE. After this the TAC was gradually reduced by 6.8%, 
19.5% and 7.9% until reaching a TAC level that allowed the stock to rebuild.  
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Figure 2.3. Stocks status indicators of rock lobster fisheries in Australia and New 
Zealand. Australian fisheries in New South Wales (nsw); South Australia northern 
zone (sanz); southern zone (sasz); Tasmania (tas); Victoria eastern zone (vicez); 
western zone (vicwz) and New Zealand fisheries in Crayfish stocks 1 to 9 (nzc1 to 9). 
CPUE: Catch per unit of effort, TAC: Total allowable catch. 
 
a b 
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Figure 2.4. Stocks status indicators of abalone fisheries in Australia and New Zealand.  
Australian fisheries in New South Wales (nsw); South Australia central zone black lip 
stock (saczBL); central zone green lip stock (saczGL); southern zone fishing down 
area black lip stock (saszfdaBL); southern zone non-fishing down area black lip stock 
(sasznfdaBL); western zone-A black lip stock (sawzaBL); western zone-A green lip 
stock (sawzaGL); western zone-B black lip stock (sawzbBL) and western zone-B 
green lip stock (sawzbGL); Tasmania (tas); Victoria central zone (viccz); Victoria 
eastern zone (vicez) western zone (vicwz) and New Zealand fisheries in Paua (abalone) 
stocks 1 to 7 (nzp2 to 4, 5A, B, D, and 7). CPUE: Catch per unit of effort, TAC: Total 
allowable catch. 
 
a b 
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Irregular patterns in stewardship were also observed in some fisheries where the TAC 
was immediately increased as soon as the CPUE began to increase following a period 
of TAC reduction. For instance, in the rock lobster fishery in NSW between 2001 and 
2004, the TAC was reduced, enabling rebuilding of the stock. However, from 2006 the 
TAC was increased again, which by 2009 resulted in the proportional increase of the 
TAC being higher than the increase of CPUE from stock rebuilding. The TAC was 
then brought back to the original level that drove CPUE down (Fig. 2.3a and b). A 
similar series of decisions occurred in the New Zealand rock lobster fisheries nzc3 and 
nzc4.  
 
Stewardship state changes 
In general, stewardship was most likely to happen when CPUE showed positive 
changes. The number of incidences of transition from the non-stewardship state to the 
stewardship state increased when stocks rebuilt and CPUE changes went from negative 
to positive (Fig. 2.4). Conversely, fisheries were more likely to remain in the non-
stewardship state when stocks were in a declining condition (negative CPUE 
differences). The probability of remaining in a non-stewardship state decreased when 
stocks showed increased CPUE values. After reaching a stewardship state in both 
abalone and rock lobster fisheries, the probability of transit to a non-stewardship state 
was less than 30%, even with high CPUE reductions. In comparison, abalone and rock 
lobster fisheries were highly likely (>60%) to remain in a stewardship condition, even 
with decreasing CPUE changes. Comparing abalone and rock lobster fisheries in non-
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stewardship condition, rock lobster fisheries required higher levels of stock rebuilding 
to transit to a stewardship condition. 
 
Figure 2.5. Probability of fisheries transiting between the states occurrence and non-
stewardship versus changes in CPUE values. Positive values of standardized CPUE 
change imply an increase of the catch rate and vice versa. 
 
TAC setting process  
A total of 60 (74%) of the people invited to participate in the survey completed the 
questionnaire, 42% were fisheries managers, 33% researchers, and 25% fishers and 
quota owners. A total of 23 fisheries were covered (Appendix 2.2). The first part of 
the questionnaire focused on the factors that may explain disagreement between 
industry and government (including research). This part of the survey was fully 
completed by 49 (82%) respondents. The second part focused on factors that explain 
the drivers behind industry calls for a TAC reduction. As not all fisheries had 
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experienced a TAC reduction, this second section was completed by 31 (52%) 
respondents.  
 
Survey respondents had varying opinions on consensus on TAC levels between 
industry and government with: 32% of respondents stating that the TAC supported by 
the industry was higher or much higher than the TAC supported by the government, 
39% of respondents thought that both positions were similar, and 29% of respondents 
stated that the industry proposed a lower TAC than the government. In situations where 
the TAC was lowered, 44% of respondents believed that 50% or more of the members 
of the industry had resisted the TAC reduction. 
 
Resistance to lowering the TAC was indicative of a lack of stewardship and numerous 
different factors were proposed as contributing to this.  The most important factors 
identified by respondents for explaining industry and government disagreement were: 
(i) not understanding ITQ systems (Q8 and Q9); (ii) concern about immediate cash 
flows (Q16);  (iii) concern about uncertainty in future performance of the fishery 
(Q15); (iv) not getting benefit from an increase in catch share value (Q14 and Q13); 
(v) no interest in benefit from an increased quota value (Q17 and Q12); (vi) fishing 
efficiency heterogeneity across the fleet (Q20); and (vii) concern about shifting 
resources to other sectors (Q18).  Not understanding the ITQ systems was a factor 
considered highly important by respondents. Hence, 90% of respondents believed 
industry viewed lower TACs as inevitably leading to a reduction in profit (Q8) and 
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62% of respondent believed that quota owners did not consider the effect of higher 
catch rates on cost of fishing (Q9) (Table 2.1).  
Table 2.1. The relative importance of factors that may explain disagreement between 
the industry and the government’s position on TAC setting. 
Factor Question 
Proportion of survey 
respondents (%) n 
Not understanding ITQ systems Q8 90.24 41 Q9 62.16 37 
    
Concern about immediate cash flows  Q16 77.5 36 
Concern about future fisheries performance Q15 71.79 38 
    
Not getting benefits from catch share value 
Q14 56.41 40 
Q13 30.77 39 
    
Partially or not interested in the catch share values Q17 46.15 39 Q12 37.50 39 
    
Fishing efficiency heterogeneity across fleet Q20 50.00 40 
Lower TACs would transfer resources to other sector Q18 42.50 39 
Catch shares can be quickly traded Q10 19.44 40 
Investor-catch share owners detached from the fishery  Q11 18.42 39 
Future prices would be lower Q19 15.38 38 
 
 
Questions related to the factor concern with immediate cash flow were rated as 
important by 78% of respondents. For 72% of respondents there was concern about 
future fisheries performance with uncertainty associated with the scale and timing of 
cost reduction that would occur with stock rebuilding. The factor not getting benefits 
from catch share value captured the fact that fishers who did not own catch shares 
were more concerned with reduction in employment than the value of catch shares, 
and 56% of respondents considered this factor important.  
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Close to 50% of the respondents regarded the factor that some quota owners may be 
partially or not interested in the quota values as important, as they may have some 
other interest in the fishery. For instance, for active fishers, the pride and enjoyment 
of catching fish may provide additional utility to business profit, and this was 
considered important by 46 % of respondents (Q17). Similarly, some quota owners 
combined fishing with processing and they receive benefit from greater  catch volumes 
in addition to the value of their catch share. This factor was considered important in 
explaining non-stewardship behaviour by more than one third (38%) of the 
respondents (Q12).  
 
The heterogeneity of fishing efficiency describes the difference in cost structures 
between different fishers. A change in the TAC that may benefit the ‘average’ operator 
does not benefit all operators.  This is potentially a source of disagreement amongst 
fishers in supporting conservative TACs and was considered important by 50% of 
respondents.  Forty three per cent of respondents considered the fishers’ concern about 
lower TACs would transfer resources to other sectors as important. For example, 
lower TACs would result in higher catch by the recreational sector rather than increase 
in stock. 
 
Three factors were considered unimportant by more than 80% of respondents. First, 
the factor of catch shares can be quickly traded, which describes the situation where 
quota owners press for higher TACs to get the short-term benefit of higher revenue 
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and then sell their catch shares before the value is affected by falling catch rates and 
thus higher cost (Q10). Second, they would be detached from the fishery which 
describes the situation where investor-catch share owners, and have a poor 
understanding of the fishery and thus do not understand the implications of TAC 
decisions (Q11), and third, catch share owners’ concern that future prices would be 
lower than current prices; therefore, reducing the incentive to save stocks for the future 
(Q19).  
 
Survey respondents had the opportunity to provide commentary on factors led to 
disagreement between industry and Government. The most frequently mentioned 
factor was that some industry members did not understand the rationale underlying 
ITQ systems, which was also evident in the strong response to Not understanding the 
ITQ systems (Q8 and Q9). Several examples of this misunderstanding of ITQ systems 
were provided. For instance, some catch share owners were concerned about TAC 
reductions because they believed that if the TAC was reduced it could never return to 
the original level even if stocks recovered. Another way the ITQ system was 
misinterpreted was the perception that TAC reductions inevitably led to reduction in 
the value of catch shares.  The corollary point was also made where fishers argued for 
higher TACs in the belief that this would inevitably increase the value of catch shares, 
with no regard of changes in catch rate, and thus cost of fishing, or longer term 
production.  Additionally, survey respondents mentioned the potentially conflicting 
interests of catch share owners within in the fishery, such as where processing 
companies who own catch shares were more driven by the benefits of greater volume 
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of product passing through their factory. Sometimes quota owned by these facilities 
has most value in leveraging catch and thus market share through complicated deals 
with other quota owners.   
 
An additional factor mentioned by respondents was mistrust of government and 
scientists by industry members but also mistrust between industry members 
themselves. Lack of trust among industry members was reflected in formation of 
factions within the industry with different interests, and a mistrust of industry leaders. 
Industry members did not trust government because they thought that fisheries 
managers did not have the required skills and that the decisions made by the 
government may have implicit political interests or bias.   
 
Survey respondents believed that Experience and knowledge was most important for 
explaining why some industry members asked for lower TACs, that is, provided clear 
evidence of stewardship (Table 2.2). There were four aspects which survey 
respondents considered important: the presence of an industry leader to explain and 
drive decisions (Q25), a functional industry group who could work together in forming 
consensus (Q27), industry members who understood the rationale of the ITQ systems 
and the way stock abundance affected the value of their catch shares (Q29); and 
observations or exposure to good outcomes from keeping the TAC low in other 
fisheries (Q28). The presence of few interactions with other sectors (MPAs and 
recreational) was considered an important factor contributing to stewardship by 39% 
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of the respondents (Q26). Less important factors for promoting stewardship were 
whether industry member were willing to consider information from economic 
analyses including bioeconomic modelling (Q24) and market aspects of the fishery 
(Q30 and Q31). 
Table 2.2. The relative importance of factors that may explain demands for lower 
TACs related to stewardship (n= 31). 
Factor Question 
Proportion of 
survey 
respondents (%) 
Experience and knowledge 
Q25 83.87 
Q27 80.65 
Q29 74.19 
Q28 48.39 
   
Few interactions with other sectors Q26 38.71 
Information from economic analysis - bioeconomic modelling Q24 29.03 
   
Market aspects  
Q30 19.35 
Q31 9.68 
 
 
2.5. Discussion  
The allocation of catch shares to fishers in ITQ systems theoretically produces a series 
of positive stock externalities that promotes stewardship of the resource (Wilen 2006; 
Costello et al. 2008, 2010). This occurs through a process where catches are 
constrained so that catch rates increase, reducing the cost of fishing, which then 
increases profitability. If the catch shares are traded in an ITQ system, their increased 
profitability is reflected in an increase in capital value.  This theoretically provides an 
incentive to limit catches to gain higher profits in the future, thus leading to resource 
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stewardship. The results of this study reveal that a large proportion of the analysed 
fisheries have responded as expected, making TAC decisions in line with resource 
stewardship. However, a non-trivial proportion (26%) of fisheries showed variable 
behaviour with TAC decisions that alternated between a state of stewardship and non-
stewardship as defined in this study by TAC response to CPUE. This raises the 
question of why TAC reductions have been resisted in some cases and can ITQ systems 
be relied upon for creating stewardship?  
 
Firstly, it is notable that ITQ systems are not necessarily required for stewardship to 
exist or to encourage constraint in catches. Stewardship has been reported in the 
absence of individual catch shares (Berkes et al. 1989; Agrawal 2001); or when catch 
shares were in place but non-catch-share owners were more conservative at setting 
TACs than catch-share owners (Gilmour et al. 2012). It was observed this in the 
current study with abalone divers in some fisheries, who did not own catch shares, but 
were reportedly more supportive of conservative TACs than many owners of the catch 
shares. This was because the divers had greater financial exposure to changes in stock 
abundance and thus catch rate. It was concluded that catch share allocation per se is 
neither a prerequisite nor sufficient to promote stewardship and additional conditions 
are required.  
 
The results of this study suggest that a high level of cooperation and leadership in 
fisher organisations is an important part of the requirements for stewardship to exist – 
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but there may still be a need for additional factors.  One factor that assists stewardship 
is experiencing the positive feedback from increased profits that can occur as a result 
of a constraining TAC and stock rebuilding. Fishers may need to see outcomes of stock 
rebuilding in practice before they support it. One of the respondents described initial 
industry resistance to a TAC reduction of about 50%. However, after ten years of 
experience the effect of higher stocks on profits, this respondent supported keeping the 
TAC at a reduced level. In the fisheries examined here, once stewardship had occurred, 
the fishery was more likely to remain in a state of stewardship. Exposure to economic 
benefits from a management policy is a factor that positively influences the fishers 
support for fisheries policies (Allegretti et al. 2012).  An implication of this is that 
providing fishers with control of TACs through co-management may not result in good 
stock outcomes unless fishers have already experienced the effects of stock rebuilding. 
 
In some of the fisheries stewardship behaviour was inconsistent through time. In these 
fisheries there was disagreement between industry and government on the required 
changes to the TAC, mostly by industry opposition to limiting the TAC. A number of 
factors that contributed to this lack of stewardship were identified, which are discussed 
below.  
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Quotas were viewed as a tool to protect stocks rather as an economic 
instrument 
The market values of catch shares are not simply determined by current profits, but 
also perceptions of future cash flows. These future cash flows are linked to the 
interplay between higher revenue from higher TACs and lower costs from lower 
TACs. Viewed in this way the TAC is an economic instrument with an optimal level 
that maximises cash flows. However, the TAC also serves a more basic purpose, which 
is to constrain catch to prevent recruitment overfishing. In some fisheries the role of 
ITQs as an economic instrument was not widely understood and they were simply 
considered to be a management control to ensure sustainability. Therefore, as soon as 
stocks rebuilt the TAC was seen to have served its purpose and fishers lobbied for a 
TAC increase (e.g. in the rock lobster and abalone fisheries in Tasmania and New 
South Wales).   
 
TAC decisions were viewed in terms of revenue rather than profit  
Some fisheries tended to be more concerned with the effect of the TAC on revenue 
(i.e. catch × price) rather than profit (i.e. revenue − costs). The following survey 
respondent’s statement illustrates this point, “I fish to the market, not to maximise my 
CPUE”. Respondents noted that in the Tasmanian rock lobster fishery increases in the 
TAC were typically viewed as good for fishing businesses because revenue increased, 
regardless of the effect on the cost of fishing (because of reduced catch rates) and thus 
profit. Another example of this issue is where catch share owners claimed that lower 
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TACs harm future profits in their efforts petitioning the government for reduced fees 
for management and other services (Ward 2011). This reveals dissociation between 
lower TACs and potentially higher profits. 
 
The factor that contributes to this disassociation indicated by respondents was that 
quota owners could easily estimate changes in revenue, but changes in fishing costs 
were uncertain and difficult to quantify. Changes in catch rate and associated changes 
in costs were the result of interactions between the fish stock and the entire fleet, 
whereas changes in revenue were directly apparent to the individual operator through 
their catches.  Respondents also said that change in revenue is immediate, whereas 
change in fishing costs may only be seen over the long term.  
 
The sanz rock lobster fishery provided an example of how the TAC decisions were 
based on revenues rather than profits. In this fishery the catch rates fell for several 
years and the TAC was not constraining.  There was industry resistance to lower TACs 
and instead catch share owners proposed government buy-back of effort (Econsearch 
2010a; Linnane et al. 2010c). This history was not consistent with stewardship and 
appeared to be caused in part by associating profitable business with large catches and 
revenues. The desire of some individuals in the sanz rock lobster fishery to maintain 
higher TACs while also arguing for interventions to reduce the number of vessels 
suggests that the outcome of the ITQ system was not well understood.  The absence of 
a constraining TAC has been shown to increase the number of operators because lease 
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quota becomes available at a low price, which then provides an incentive for new 
entrants to the fishery (Emery et al. 2014a).  
 
There was uncertainty around stock rebuilding outcomes  
Expectations around stock rebuilding and the scale of change in catch rate are critical 
to any decision to constrain the catch. The opportunity to observe stock rebuilding in 
similar fisheries can be helpful, as occurred with NZ fishers in the management area 
CRA 4 who saw large increases in rock lobster stocks in a similar fishery at CRA 8 
when the TAC was reduced in that zone (Breen et al. 2008). This understanding of 
stock rebuilding and resultant stewardship led fishers to voluntarily establish a 
performance rule to constrain the TAC (Breen et al. 2009; Miller and Breen 2010). 
This factor is related to the observation from other fisheries that a lack of stewardship 
occurred where there was lack of understanding of stock rebuilding.    
 
The industry is not a simple collective of catch share owners 
Some specific groups of stakeholders, such as fishing labourers or processors, receive 
most benefit when the tonnage of the catch rather than the economic yield is 
maximised. These stakeholders were sometimes included in the consultation or 
industry group processes used to develop a consensus position on future TACs. Survey 
respondents said that in these situations the industry tended to favour higher TACs and 
exhibit less stewardship. In contrast, decision-making that involved greater 
representation of catch share owners may be more focused on long term asset prices 
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than tonnage. This was the case in New Zealand rock lobster stocks where the advisory 
committee was mainly made up of catch share owners-operators (e.g. nzc8) who were 
closely involved in the management decision process (Yandle 2008a).  
 
Voting systems can skew the position of industry representative groups resulting in 
either more or less stewardship in quota setting.  In some fisheries such as the NZ 
stocks or the Tasmanian abalone fishery, the voting process schema was proportionally 
based on quota ownership, basically one vote for each catch share (Yandle 2008b).  
Survey respondents explained that in the Tasmanian rock lobster the voting system 
was based on one vote for each member, and membership included processors, 
deckhands, lease fishers, and catch share-owners.  These different structures were 
considered to affect the outcome of the overall vote thus affecting the overall degree 
of stewardship in TAC setting.  
 
Fishers may have a high discount rate  
Stewardship in setting low TACs to rebuild stock involves foregoing current earnings 
to increase long-run profitability.  The willingness of operators to take this step is a 
function of their discount rate, how much more they value current earnings compared 
to those in the future.  Fishing is a risky business because of stock uncertainty driven 
by factors such as recruitment failures and diseases. Uncertainty favours high discount 
rates (Piourde and Bodell 1984), creating greater emphasis on the present value, which 
would be expected to result in support for higher TACs.  
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There are also business and market factors that can affect discount rate (Midani and 
Lee 2014) and thus stewardship.  Survey respondents said that catch share owners tend 
to lobby for higher TACs when they have greater levels of borrowing or are otherwise 
more exposed to short-term cash flow issues in their business. A less frequent 
occurrence was where catch share owners had high discount rates when they wanted 
to exit the fishery. For instance, in the viccz abalone fishery, industry members were 
able to reach consensus prior to the outbreak of a disease that devastated the stock 
(Abalone Viral Ganglioneuritis). However, after this disease outbreak the group split 
into two factions, with one wanting to sell their quotas and lobbying for higher TACs 
to maintain the quota price despite large decline in stock abundance.  
 
Fisher’s non-financial utility from fishing  
Stewardship theoretically arises with ITQs because long-run earnings and wealth of 
catch share owners increases.  However, some respondents believed that there are non-
monetary benefits of fishing that also influence decision making but are not captured.  
Their point was that some fishers consider fishing an intrinsically enjoyable activity 
and prefer to maintain the capacity to take larger catches. Challenges such as finding 
fish, developing skills to work in a risky environment, competition with others fishers 
and being an independent business person amongst other factors, contribute to job 
satisfaction (Gatewood and McCay 1990; Pollnac et al. 2001; Pollnac and Poggie 
2006). This seems particularly the case for fishers who have a family history of fishing 
and who operate in remote areas.  These fishers attribute additional non-monetary 
value to fishing, which is not only based on enjoyment of fishing but also on apparent 
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barriers to moving to another type of employment (Smith 1981). Thus long term gains 
in catch rates from lower TACs may not outweigh the total loss of utility from lower 
catches. As a fisheries manager who answered the survey mentioned, “many fishers 
say that quota systems stop them from being 'fishermen'”.  
 
There is less benefit from a lower commercial catch if allocation is shifted to 
other sectors (recreational, MPAs) 
The benefits of constraining TACs occur through stock rebuilding and subsequent 
increases in catch rates. However, this benefit is reduced if the catches or stocks are 
shifted to another sector. While ITQ systems grant exclusive fishing allocations to the 
total allowable commercial catch, it is possible for recreational catch or coverage of 
MPAs to expand independently thus negating any benefits of constraint in catch.  
 
Recreational catch may reduce stewardship of catch share owners through a simple 
process where a lower commercial TAC results in higher recreational catch rates, 
leading to increased recreational participation and slowing of stock rebuilding. 
Additionally, the unknown amount of fish caught by the recreational sector introduces 
uncertainty in the system (Yandle 2008a), which affects the catch share owners’ 
willingness to be stewards, as the confidence in the management system is weakened. 
This effect was mentioned by survey respondents, and they also said that the effect of 
this on stewardship was greater when the recreational catch was large and was given 
preferential allocation.  
Chapter 2   Do catch shares promote stewardship? 
38 
 
Declaration of MPAs can also reduce stewardship by catch share owners because they 
displace catch into the resultantly smaller areas that remain open for fishing.  This 
reduces or even eliminates any benefit to catch share owners from TAC reduction in 
terms of increase in catch rate (Hobday et al. 2005; Hilborn et al. 2006). Fishers are 
conscious of this potential impact of MPAs and have said they undermine ITQ 
systems, in particular the value of fishing allocations (Treloggen 2005). The short-term 
effect of MPAs immediately impacts individual operators that are directly displaced, 
but in the long term all operators are impacted if catch is displaced to fishing grounds 
reduced in size.  Fishers will experience higher costs as they need to develop expertise 
in fishing in new grounds (Econsearch 2010a,b).    
 
The effects of recreational fishing and MPAs on stewardship of catch share owners in 
TAC setting occur because they affect the security of the allocation.  This security is 
considered critical to operators in terms of profit maximization and long-term 
stewardship (Grafton et al. 2000; Arnason 2007) and is also reflected in the market 
price of quotas (Arnason 1990; Batstone and Sharp 2003).  
 
2.6. Conclusion 
Resource stewardship behaviour that is theoretically associated with ITQ systems is 
likely to occur where catch share owners are focused on long-run maximization of 
economic yield. Patterns in TAC setting and catch rates in most rock lobster and 
abalone fisheries in Australia and New Zealand examined here were consistent with 
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this theoretical outcome of ITQ systems. Stewardship tends to be present in fisheries 
with well-developed and functioning fisher associations led by individuals who were 
able to drive stewardship decisions and consensus.  However, variable stewardship 
behaviour through time was also observed in a considerable number of fisheries.  In 
these cases, industry did not always lobby for or support TACs that would result in 
stock recovery and long term increase in economic yield.   
 
There were many factors that contributed to the lack of stewardship in these ITQ 
fisheries.  The most important appeared to be a lack of understanding of the principles 
and purpose of ITQ systems by catch share owners. They saw TACs as a sustainability 
control mechanism and not as an economic instrument; therefore, they lobbied for a 
TAC increase as soon as stocks began to rebuild. The relationship between abundant 
stocks and lower costs associated with lower TACs was poorly understood, sometimes 
driven by the fact that they had no historical experience of stock rebuilding.  Often 
catch share owners were more focused on revenues than profit and were more 
concerned about the loss of revenue from lower TACs than cost reduction from higher 
catch rates. Some catch share owners have high discount rate, such as when exposed 
to immediate cash-flow issues or when planning to exit the fishery in the short term.  
A lack of stewardship could also occur as a result of the voting systems used to develop 
the industry position on TACs, such as where the vote did not reflect the interests of 
catch share owners.  Other issues that were less important but still undermined 
stewardship included the presence of non-financial benefits some fishers get from 
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taking large catch, and competition for allocation of the stock with other sectors, such 
as recreational fishers and MPAs.    
 
This article provides evidence that the implementation of ITQs does not automatically 
result in resource stewardship by industry and additional conditions and management 
are needed to achieve industry wide stewardship. In the absence of these additional 
conditions, catch share owners are likely to continue to display the behaviour that ITQ 
systems were meant to eliminate and the arm wrestle between industry and 
Government in setting TAC levels will remain. This is especially critical when co-
management schemes provide greater industry control in TAC setting.  Part of 
implementing effective ITQ systems thus involves resourcing effective training and 
communication to the industry on the functioning of ITQs as an economic instrument. 
There is also a need to recognise that industry cannot be expected to exhibit 
stewardship in TAC setting in some fisheries; for example, if the industry association 
is dominated by firms that do not own ITQ units and benefit from large volume of 
product (e.g. lease fishers and processors) or where there is significant competition 
with other sectors (e.g. recreational fishers and MPAs).  Careful planning of the 
inherent details of ITQ systems is required if existing resource stewardship is to be 
maintained and stewardship is to be initiated where it is currently absent.  
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2.7. Appendices 
2.7.1. Appendix 2.1: Survey applied to quota owners fishers, fisheries 
managers, and researchers to assess the conditions needed for resource 
stewardship to occur in ITQ systems. 
 
Survey applied to quota owners fishers, fisheries managers, and researchers to assess 
the conditions needed for resource stewardship to occur in ITQ systems. 
Survey: Total allowable catch setting in fisheries managed under individual 
transferable quota system 
 
Respondents choose between the following alternatives, unless other options 
indicated: 
not important / minor effect / important / very important / most critical factor 
For every question there was a textbox for optional comments. 
I. Respondent profile 
1. Position 
2. Fishery 
3. Do you engage in the TAC setting process for a fishery? 
4. Fishery: please give jurisdiction and species 
II Industry participation 
5. Has there been industry involvement in the year-to-year TAC setting process since 
ITQs were implemented, such as in committee discussions? 
Yes/No,   There is a decision rule instead TAC committee discussion (If so, please, 
complete the rest of this survey thinking about the situation before the decision rule) 
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III Goverment-industry dis/agreement on TAC setting 
6. Thinking about TAC decision in the last 10 years, how different from the 
Government's position were the TACs supported by the industry? 
 
7. Thinking of the most significant case when the TAC was lowered, roughly 
what proportion of the industry resisted this change? 
almost all / about 75% / about 50% / about 25% / none / N/A (the TAC has never been 
reduced) / Other (please specify)  
 
IV Why did some (or all) industry members resist a lower TAC?  
We're interested in knowing the details behind situations when industry resists 
having lower TACs. Do you think that any of the following factors played a part? 
(There can be more than one factor involved) 
There was resistance to reducing the TAC because: ... 
 
8. Lower TACs were viewed by the industry as inevitably leading to a reduction in 
profit. 
 
9. Industry didn't consider the effect of higher catch rates on lower costs. 
 
10. Quota owners can trade in and out of the fishery quickly so can get the short term 
benefit of higher catches....and then sell out before catch rates decline. 
 
11. Quota owners were detached from the fishery (investors) and had a poor 
understanding of the fishery so failed to appreciate the benefit of higher catch rates 
Chapter 2   Do catch shares promote stewardship? 
43 
 
/ lower costs that tend to occur with lower TACs. 
 
12. Quota owners had some other interest in the fishery, which benefited from volume 
of product. For example, if quota owners were also processors they could benefit from 
higher volumes of product into their processing operation. 
 
13. Fishers who didn't own quota had little financial exposure to the value of quota 
units. 
 
14. Fishers who didn't own quota were concerned that a lower TAC would lead to 
fewer vessels and / or reduced employment. 
 
15. Active fishers were concerned about uncertainty in the scale and timing of cost 
reductions that would occur with stock rebuilding. 
 
16. Active fishers were concerned with immediate cash flow rather than long-term 
improvement in profitability (e.g. if their cash flow was squeezed because of loans and 
the need to maintain payments). 
 
17. Beside considering business profit he pride and enjoyment of catching fish may 
be important for active fishers. How important was that? 
 
18. Industry members were concerned that a reduced commercial catch would shift the 
resource to other sectors; for example, by helping expansion of recreational catch or 
MPAs. 
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19. Quota owners were concerned that future quota prices may be lower than current 
prices, so there was little point in saving stock for the future. 
 
20. The fishery was a mix of individuals. Some were better fishers who have higher 
catch rates even when stocks are reduced. For these individuals, arguing against lower 
TACs was rational for their profitability. 
 
21. Were there any other factors that led to some industry members arguing 
against a lower TAC? 
 
V Industry resisting higher TACs 
 
22. Has there been a situation in your fishery where industry members asked for a TAC 
reduction? 
Yes / no 
 
23. Has there been a situation in your fishery where industry members asked to keep 
TAC constant? 
Yes / no 
 
VI Industry resisting higher TACs 
When some (or all) industry members called for lower TACs or resisted higher TACs, 
were any of the following factors important? 
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24. Information from economic analyses or bioeconomic modelling. 
25. An industry leader who helped explains and drives the decision. 
 
26. Few interactions with other sectors such as recreational fishers or MPAs 
provided fishers with confidence that they would directly benefit from higher stock 
abundance. 
 
27. The industry group worked well together in forming consensus. 
 
28. Industry members were motivated by observations of good outcomes from keeping 
the TAC low elsewhere (even in a different fishery). 
29. Quota owners were concerned about the value of their quota units and wanted to 
increase or protect the value of these units. 
 
30. Industry was looking for access to certain markets, which was difficult 
without higher stock abundances at certain times. 
 
31. Certification schemes or some other form of market pressure from consumers 
meant that there was benefit in avoiding higher TACs.  
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2.7.2. Appendix 2.2. Fisheries and jurisdictions that survey respondents are 
related with 
 
Fishery  Jurisdiction 
Abalone 
New South Wales 
South Australia Central Zone 
South Australia Western Zone 
Tasmania 
Victorian Central Zone 
Victorian Eastern Zone 
Victorian Western Zone 
Western Australia 
  
Blue crab South Australia 
Deep Sea Crustacean Managed Western Australia 
Giant crab Tasmania 
Mud Cockle  South Australia 
  
Pink snapper  
Western Australia Gascoyne 
Demersal Scalefish Managed 
Fishery (Shark Bay) 
  
Eastern rock lobster New South Wales 
  
Southern rock lobster 
New Zealand Cray 5 
New Zealand Cray 8 
South Australia Northern Zone 
South Australia Southern Zone 
Tasmania 
Victoria Eastern Zone 
Victoria Western Zone 
  
Western rock lobster Western Australia 
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Chapter 3  
Changes in the lease and 
permanent sale quota markets 
of a rock lobster fishery in 
response to stock abundance 
 
 
This chapter previously published as:  
León, R., Gardner, C, van Putten, I. Hartmann, K. (2015) Changes in the lease and 
permanent sale quota markets of a rock lobster fishery in response to stock abundance, 
ICES Journal of Marine Science; doi:10.1093/icesjms/fsu246 
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3.1. Abstract 
Effective individual transferable quotas (ITQ) systems rebuild stocks and allow 
transfer of quotas to more efficient operators. This process requires functional markets 
for both quota sales and temporary quota leases.  These markets are expected to 
respond to changes in economic rent from the fishery, which is influenced by stock 
abundance and the international rock lobster price. This research used multistate 
Markov modelling and Granger-causality testing to examine changes in the permanent 
and temporary quota trade in the Tasmanian rock lobster fishery quota market, during 
periods of both increasing and decreasing stock abundance. The permanent quota trade 
market was more active during the period of stock growth while the quota lease market 
was active in both periods of stock growth and decline. In contrast to theoretical trends 
in ITQ fisheries, trades in both markets were not linked to the technical efficiency (i.e. 
catching capability) of operators, but were more driven by the quota owners’ financial 
capacity (i.e. number of owned quotas).  Prolonged and unexpected stock decline 
affected the quota market so that it deviated from the theoretical pattern of ITQ 
fisheries. Operators previously active in the market reduced their activity while smaller 
operators and firms that previously had not traded became more active, so the fleet 
expanded with smaller operators entering. 
Keywords:  ITQ fishery, owned/fished quotas, temporary/permanent transfers, 
technical efficiency, Tasmania 
  
Chapter 3                                                          Quota market changes with stock abundance 
49 
 
3.2. Introduction 
Individual Transferable Quotas (ITQ) are an economic instrument that involve the 
allocation of shares of a total allowable catch (TAC) that can be traded between 
individuals, typically licence holders. Theoretically, ITQs improve economic 
efficiency by increasing the incentive to minimize cost, which leads to fleet 
rationalization (Grafton et al. 2000; Costello et al. 2008). In order for the ITQ system 
to produce these outcomes there must be a constraining TAC set by the fishery 
authority, and a functional market for both permanent transfers (sales) and temporary 
leasing of quotas, which can lead to an autonomous regulation of the fleet (Kompas et 
al. 2009). It has been shown that ITQ systems are efficient as long as the TAC is set 
optimally and the quota market is competitive (Clark 1980; Arnason 1990). 
 
ITQ management plans are frequently implemented based on a biological sustainable 
level (Batstone and Sharp 1999); however, the plans also need to focus on economic 
rather than biological outcomes. ITQ systems are economic instruments and, 
management plans should focus on a maximum economic yield as well as maximum 
sustainable yield (Gardner et al. 2015a). Thus, when ITQ systems are operating 
effectively, stakeholders are motivated to set conservative catch limits so that stocks 
rebuild and cost of fishing decreases, increasing the value of the quota units on the 
market (Wilen 2006). A functional market is important for these outcomes because it 
rewards good decision-making and facilitates quota unit transfers to operators with 
lower fishing costs who are more able to expand quota ownership. At the same time, 
the quota market provides incentive for less efficient operators who have higher fishing 
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costs to exit the fishery motivated by the compensation they will receive from the sale 
of quota.  
 
The transfer of ITQ units in a well-functioning quota market is influenced by many 
factors including the availability and cost of relevant information to make trading 
decisions (e.g. price and availability of quota units, number of agents trading, etc.) as 
well as the cost of the transactions between operators (Rose 2002). The quota price 
should reflect future cash flows and incorporate expectation of changes in future 
profitability. This is confirmed by the relationship between stock productivity and both 
permanent quota sales and temporary quota lease prices  (Arnason 1990; Batstone and 
Sharp 2003; Newell et al. 2005). Quota prices are therefore critical for informing 
operators on decisions of increasing or reducing their ownership of quota units as well 
as shorter term decisions on leasing quota in or out within a fishing season. 
 
There are many possible barriers to the effective functioning of quota markets 
including high transaction costs, lack of information, or asymmetrical information 
flows where some agents have more or better market information than others, creating 
power imbalances when they trade. The transaction costs of quota owners with a small 
and medium size holding are mainly associated with brokerage service fees while in 
the case of quota owners with large holdings these costs include employment of quota 
managers (Newell et al. 2005; van Putten and Gardner 2010). When transaction costs 
are excessively high, the volume of transactions will fall, leading to noisy price signals 
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and reductions in gains (Stavins 1995). For instance, in the Australian coral reef finfish 
fishery, unfished quotas were attributed to an imperfect flow of information and high 
transaction costs, which mainly affected small operators during low quota market 
activity (Innes et al. 2012). Similar problems have also been observed in the 
Tasmanian rock lobster fishery (TRLF) during a period when the TAC was not entirely 
caught (non-limiting).  At this time, quota owners had imperfect information about 
profitability in the fishery and priced their quotas at a value that was too high, resulting 
in a market that did not clear so quota was left untraded and uncaught (Emery et al. 
2014a).    
 
Quota trading volume may also be affected by a lack of incentives for inactive owners 
(investors) to sell their quotas, resulting in reduced trade. These quota owners are 
usually fishers who gradually reduce their fishing effort but remain linked to the 
fishery by leasing their quota to active fishers (van Putten and Gardner 2010). This 
gives rise to a situation common to many fisheries where decisions by quota owners 
are not only driven by profitability of the fisher but also by the desire to avoid capital 
gains tax, payable on disposal of units (Butler 2004; Pinkerton and Edwards 2009). 
Consequently, quota units become scarce and small operators struggle to increase their 
level of ownership. Thus, marginal operators may remain in the fishery preferring to 
make a smaller profit rather than incur a one-off tax payment (del Valle et al. 2008; 
Pinkerton and Edwards 2009; van Putten and Gardner 2010). 
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The TRLF examined here has operated under an ITQ management system since 1998, 
which was introduced in response to declining stock productivity (Bradshaw 2004). 
The TAC is set annually and distributed equally between 10,507 quota units. Quota 
units were initially distributed solely on ownership of licences, with no account of 
catch history. There is no minimum quota ownership, but units can only be fished if 
associated with a fishing license, owning at least five quota units, and holding a 
minimum of 15 units.  There is also a maximum quota-holding limit of 200 units 
designed to prevent concentration of ownership. Markets for both sale and temporary 
lease of quota units have developed with both the number of participants and the 
number of transactions increasing through time (van Putten and Gardner 2010).  
 
This fishery went through an initial period of rapid stock rebuilding during which 
biomass and catch rates increased after the introduction of the ITQ system in 1998 
until 2006 (Fig. 3.1). Over this period, the TAC was entirely caught and quota lease 
prices rose (Gardner et al. 2011).  In the following years the trend reversed and 
performance indicators steadily decreased as a result of a period of low recruitment 
(Linnane et al. 2010a). The TAC was under-caught in some years and catch rate 
decreased by 34.2% from 2006 to 2011. This decline was also reflected in declining 
lease price (Gardner et al. 2011).   
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Figure 3.1. Stock status and asset value indicators for Tasmanian rock lobster fishery 
(Hartmann et al. 2012). 
 
Well-functioning quota markets are expected to respond to changes in stock 
productivity and other economic signals such as beach price and labour costs. 
Adjustments in the value of quota units are expected to influence changes in quota 
ownership and the volume of quota traded on the market. The TRLF provided an 
opportunity to examine whether the permanent sale and temporary lease quota markets 
responded differently to periods of abundant and depleted stock biomass. The 
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transition rate of quota owners through different levels of ownership and fishing effort 
was examined to assess whether trading behaviour and trends in ownership responded 
to changes in stock biomass.  
  
3.3. Methods 
Data 
Tasmanian rock lobster fishery (TRLF) data were compiled from a database 
maintained by the Department of Primary Industries, Parks, Water and Environment 
(DPIPWE), Tasmanian Government. The data comprised information on the number 
of quota units owned and held (owned + leased in - leased out quotas) per fisher at the 
end of every fishing season from 2000 to 2012. These are panel data, collected from 
multiple subjects at the same point in the time at different times in a given period. As 
the measurements were repeated, subjects showed autocorrelation, and as the subjects 
interacted with each other, there was also correlation amongst them. The statistical 
methods explained below are suitable to analyse this kind of panel data. The number 
of leased in/out quota units per fisher per year was derived by subtracting the number 
of quota units owned from the number of quota units held. Positive values represented 
the number of quotas leased in and negative values represented the number of quotas 
leased out. Two additional variables were used in the analysis, stock status and the 
individual annual average catch per unit of effort (CPUE; kg per pot lift). The TRLF 
stock status was categorized into stock growth (2000-2006) and decline (2007-2012) 
periods. 
Chapter 3                                                          Quota market changes with stock abundance 
55 
 
The CPUE was used as a proxy for technical (fishing/cost) efficiency; despite it being 
an imperfect measure for comparing individual vessels as their costs may be different 
(McGarvey et al. 2014).  Nonetheless, profitability of an individual vessel will increase 
when CPUE increases for a given set of inputs.  Therefore, while CPUE may not 
capture all the differences in efficiency between vessels, it does represent an important 
determinant of vessel productivity.  In addition to stock abundance, catch rates also 
vary with, for instance, skipper skill, fishing month, and fishing depth. These factors 
are taken into account in the standardization of stock assessments in the fishery 
(Gardner et al. 2011).  However, these factors are likely to have less of an effect 
compared with stock abundance (Green et al. 2014; Feenstra et al. 2014). Additionally, 
fishing operations are relatively standard in the TRLF as pots dimensions are 
controlled in the fishery management rules.  In the TRLF there is a limit of 50 pots in 
operation per vessel. Pots are typically set and hauled twice per day. Lobsters can 
escape so catch rates drop after one day and regulations prohibit leaving pots deployed 
for longer than 48 hours. Finally, rock lobster price in the Tasmanian fishery is 
relatively stable and fishers receive approximately the same price for lobsters, because 
catch is sold to a small number of processors who tend to have the same price although 
this varies daily and with size and colour of lobster depending on demand from export 
markets (Chandrapavan et al. 2009). 
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Quota ownership and quota leasing trends 
Quota owners were classified into categories according to the number of quota units 
owned and the fraction leased in/out units relative to their ownership. Quota owner 
categories were analysed over time to determine trends for the whole fishery in terms 
of permanent and temporary quota transfers.  
 
Individual quota ownership and leasing transitions 
The transition of individual quota owners through different ownership and leasing 
categories was analysed to examine and deduce collective quota owner behaviour in 
the sale and the lease markets. Given that the objective was describe the progression 
of categorical responses variables over time, Multistate Markov (MSM) models were 
used to describe movements or transitions of quota owners through different states. 
(Kalbfleisch and Lawless 1985; Jackson et al. 2003). Transitions could be in both 
directions and were expressed as rates; that is, the number of quota owners transiting 
to another state relative to the total number of subjects in the original state.  
 
In the current study, two MSM models were fitted. The first model was the ownership 
model where the states represented levels of quota ownership and only involved 
permanent quota transfers in the permanent sale market. The following four states 
applied to this model: (i) small owner with between one and 15 quota units; (ii) 
medium owners with between 16 and 40 units; (iii) large owners with more than 40 
units; and (iv) fishers who exited the fishery (Fig. 3.2a). Transition from one ownership 
Chapter 3                                                          Quota market changes with stock abundance 
57 
 
state to another represented the sale or permanent transference of quota units, 
increasing or reducing units owned by a fisher. Stock status and number of fished 
quotas or catch (owned plus leased in quotas) were used as covariates. The catch of 
each operator provided a measure of scale of operation and financial capacity. 
 
The second model was the leasing model, where the states represented the temporary 
(within season) transfer of quota units through the lease market. The five states in this 
model were: (i) non-leaser, with no participation in the lease market during one or 
more seasons; (ii) small leasers-out, which were owners who leased out between 1 and 
50% of their quota ownership; (iii) large leasers-out, who leased out more than 50% 
of their quota ownership; (iv) small leasers-in, who leased in between 1 and 25% of 
their quota ownership; and (v) large leasers-in, who leased in more than 25% of their 
quota ownership (Fig. 3.2a). Transition from one state to another represented an 
increase or reduction in the number of leased quotas units traded in the quota lease 
market relative to the quota ownership because of trading in the quota lease market. In 
this model, the covariates were stock status and level of quota ownership with 
ownership a measure of financial capacity. For fishers who transited between states in 
the leasing model, the average individual CPUE was calculated as an indicator of their 
technical efficiency. 
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Figure 3.2. Quota ownership (A) and leasing (B) states Multistate Markov model for 
Tasmanian rock lobster fishery. The transition rates between alternative states are 
denoted by q.    
 
For both models, the threshold between states and the number of states was chosen to 
ensure an adequate representation of quota transfers. The base criterion used was a 
sensitivity analysis of the fishers’ profit margin to the number of owned and fished 
quotas in the TRLF (van Putten and Gardner 2010). Different combinations of owned 
and fished quotas resulted in different levels of accounting profit. The thresholds were 
adjusted to avoid the transitions being hidden due to the number of quota ownership 
or leasing transiting being too large.  Conversely, if the states covered too narrow a 
range, any trends in the number of subjects moving from one state to another would 
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be difficult to detect because of small numbers of transitions. Both situations produce 
convergence failure during the process of rate estimation. Transitions between non-
consecutive states were rare across the entire study period and were therefore not 
considered. 
 
MSM models may be described by transition intensity matrices, where every term is 
the transition rate (qrs) from one state (r) to other (s) estimated by the maximum 
likelihood through the R package msm (Jackson 2011). For each model, a Pearson-
type test was applied to assess the goodness-of-fit that contrast observed versus 
expected number of transitions between pairs of states and p-values were estimated by 
parametric bootstrapping (Aguirre-Hernández and Farewell 2002; Titman and 
Sharples 2010). For both ownership and leasing models there was no significant 
difference between the observed and expected number of transitions (p=0.079 and 
p=0.093 respectively). 
    
Transition of quota units to more efficient operators 
ITQ systems theoretically result in the transit of quota units to more efficient operators. 
It was therefore expected that fishers with higher net profit, or those who had been in 
the fishing sector longer and had more experience, would own and/or lease a larger 
number of quotas in. A Granger non-causality test was carried out to see whether 
greater experience and fishing efficiency caused a higher level of quota ownership 
and/or leasing in.  The underlying rationale of this test is that; for instance, CPUE 
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‘Granger-caused’ ownership, if the present ownership could be better predicted by 
present and past CPUE and ownership than by past ownership alone (Lütkepohl 2005).  
 
The Granger non-causality test involves fitting an unrestricted and restricted model 
(exemplified below) where the hypothesis that CPUE ‘caused’ the level of ownership 
(number of owned quotas per operator) was being tested. The unrestricted model 
included on the right-hand side an endogenous variable, which was the response 
variable itself lagged p-1 times, the ownership level (y in the equation below); and an 
exogenous variable, which was an explanatory variable lagged p times, CPUE (x in 
the equation below) (Erdil and Yetkiner 2004). The restricted model only included the 
endogenous variable, ownership. The unrestricted model was as follows: 
ݕ௧ = ∑ ��ݕ௧−���=ଵ + ∑ ��ݔ௧−� + �௧��=଴  
Where ��   and ��  were the coefficients of the lagged endogenous and exogenous 
variables respectively. 
  
The restricted model included only the first part of the right-hand side of the equation; 
and tested whether or not �� coefficients were null, using a Wald test. The hypotheses 
tested were: i) CPUE “caused” ownership, ii) fished quotas (owned plus leased in) 
“caused” CPUE, iii) experience (years in the fishery) “caused” CPUE, and iv) 
ownership “caused” the number of fished quotas. Each hypothesis was also tested in 
Chapter 3                                                          Quota market changes with stock abundance 
61 
 
the opposite direction; for instance, ownership “caused” CPUE and so on. Quota 
owners who were inactive fishers were excluded from this analysis, because there is 
no data of fishing activity from them. Given that the Granger test involves fitting 
dynamic models (i.e. with lagged variables), which in general lack of strict exogeneity 
of regressors and the type of data was panel data, the Generalized Method of Moments 
(GMM) estimator was applied (Holtz-Eakin et al. 1988; Arellano, R., Bond 1991). The 
GMM models fitting and diagnosis tests were carried out using the R package plm 
(Croissant and Giovanni 2008). The results of this test revealed that the number of 
owned and fished quotas “Granger-caused” the level of CPUE. Therefore, taking into 
account that the data were organized in cross sections (data collected from many 
subjects at the same point in time over a given period of time), a mixed effects model 
was fitted to describe the effect of ownership and scale of operation on the individual 
technical efficiency. 
 
3.4. Results 
Trends in quota ownership 
There was a general trend across the fishery of medium quota owners moving towards 
either the small or large quota owner groups (Fig. 3.3). Despite the declining trend in 
the medium ownership group, this remained the largest group in the fishery across the 
study period. The largest change in the number of quota owners per group occurred 
during the period of growth in stock and CPUE (2000-2006). During this period the 
number of medium quota owners dropped by 45 individuals, while the number of small 
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and large quota owners increased by 16 and 25 individuals respectively. This meant 
that a larger number of medium quota owners acquired additional units in the quota 
market, relative to those medium owners who sold quota.  During the period of decline 
in stock and CPUE (2007-2012), the number of owners per group remained relatively 
stationary with the trend similar to the previous period. Transition of quota owners 
amongst the different states happened from year to year over the whole period of study.   
 
Figure 3.3. Trend over time of quota ownership categories. 
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Quota ownership transitions through the quota sale market 
The largest transition rates amongst different ownership states were observed during 
the stock growth period, when quota owners were more active in buying and selling 
quota units. Small and medium quota owners were most active during the time of stock 
growth. The transition rate of medium quota owners to the group of large quota owners 
was significantly higher at times of stock growth than in periods of stock decline 
(t=3.92, p=0.01, Fig. 3.4a). Small quota owners showed a high transition to the group 
of medium owners in the stock growth period; however a similar high transition rate 
was also observed during period of stock decline for this small quota owner group 
(t=1.14,p=0.31).  
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Figure 3.4. Transition rate amongst different levels of quota ownership (a) during the 
periods of stock growth and decline and (a) for three levels of fished quotas (i.e. total 
of quota owned and balance of quota leased in and leased out). 
 
Transition of individual operators between different ownership states, in some cases 
appeared to be influenced by their financial capacity in terms of ownership and number 
of fished quotas (total owned and leased quota units) and interest in expanding their 
business. For instance, medium quota owners, who fished a large number of quota 
units by leasing in additional units, had higher rates of ownership increase than 
medium owners catching medium or small numbers of quota units (lowest difference 
t=4.59, p<0.01, Fig. 3.4a).  
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Conversely, the upgrading of small to medium quota owners through the quota market 
did not appear influenced by the presumed lower financial capacity of this group. 
Small quota owners who fished a small number of units showed a higher upgrading 
rate than medium owners that also fished a small number of units (t=3.37, p=0.02, Fig. 
3.4a). Additionally, all small owners, increased their ownership at a similar rate 
regardless of the number of quotas they fished (largest difference t=1.52, p=0.19).  
 
Rates of exiting the fishery varied with smaller owners exiting the fishery at a higher 
rate than medium and large quota owners (Fig. 3.5a and b). Ownership categories 
affected exiting rates (Fig 4a; t=4.86, p<0.01, t=5.12, p<0.01 for the test of the two 
ownership categories with most similar transition rates) and this was not moderated by 
the stock status (p>0.05). In a test of whether both ownership and number of quota 
fished affected exiting rates, once again it was apparent that ownership affected exiting 
the industry. A greater number of small owners left (Fig. 3.5b; t=5.97, p<0.01, t=4.56, 
p<0.01 for the test of the categories with most similar transition rates) while the 
number of quotas actually fished did not influence the exiting rate (p>0.05). There was 
no apparent link between exit rate and individual technical efficiency (CPUE) 
measured the year before exiting (Table 3.1). Although medium owners who fished 
more quotas had a significantly higher CPUE relative to medium owners who fished 
lower number of quotas (t=2.88, p=0.016), the exit rate remained constant across the 
medium owners group (medium owner who fished higher vs. lower number of quotas 
t=1.42, p=0.21). 
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Figure 3.5. Fishery exit rate for three different levels of quota ownership (a) during 
the period of stock growth and decline and (a) for three levels of fished quotas (i.e. the 
sum of quota owned and the balance of quota leased in and leased out). 
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Table 3.1. Average CPUE and Standard deviation in parentheses for small, medium 
and large quota owners for different catch levels the year before to exiting the fishery. 
Catch level 
(Number of fished quotas) 
Small Medium Large 
Low (15-20) 0.86(0.28) 0.81(0.44) - 
Medium (21-40) 0.95(0.27) 0.80(0.20) 1.53(0.81) 
High (>40) 1.10(0.26) 1.17(0.10) 1.80(0.84) 
tLow vs Medium 0.69(0.500) 0.38(0.709) - 
tLow vs High 1.93(0.074) 1.78(0.106) - 
tMedium vs High 1.26(0.227) 2.88(0.016) 0.43(0.698) 
Pairwise t test to assess difference of CPUE amongst the three catch 
levels, p-values in parentheses. 
 
Trends in quota leasing activity  
Variation in leasing activity could be categorized into four stages. Through the period 
of stock growth (2000 to 2006), the number of operators who did not participate in the 
lease market (non-leasers) declined during the first three years. An additional 20 
operators who previously did not trade quota units, became active in the leasing market 
(Fig. 3.6). During the second part of the stock growth period (2004 to 2006), there 
were no changes in the number of operators leasing quotas units. During the first two 
years of the stock decline period (2007 to 2012) 16 additional operators who did not 
previously trade quota units entered the leasing market. The following years in the 
period of stock decline the number of operators who leased quotas remained 
approximately constant.  
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Figure 3.6. Trend over time of leasing categories and catch rates (CPUE). 
 
The leasing activities of small leaser-in and small leaser-out on the quota market 
showed two different tendencies during the period of stock growth (Fig. 3.6). Before 
2003 the number of operators who leased a small number of quotas in and out showed 
an increasing trend which peaked in 2003. After 2003, the number of small leaser-
in/out decreased, reaching a minimum in 2006, just when the stock reached a 
maximum. In contrast, the number of large leaser-in/out steadily increased during the 
period of stock growth, reaching a maximum in 2006.  
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Throughout the period of stock decline, the trend in the number of large leasers-out 
followed the same pattern as the stock abundance (Fig. 3.6). In contrast, the number 
of small leasers-out followed an opposite pattern.  The number of small leasers-out 
peaked in 2010, just when the stock abundance reached a minimum and, in the 
following two years, the number of small leasers-out declined while the stock showed 
signs of rebuilding. The number of large leasers-out peaked in 2007, decreased after 
that and reaching a minimum in 2010. The numbers began to increase again after 2010, 
when the stock began to rebuild. In the period of stock decline the number of leasers-
in remained approximately constant. During this stock decline period the number of 
large leasers-in reached a maximum in 2008 and remained approximately constant 
after that. 
 
Rates of transitions in number of fished quotas 
Changes in the stock status appeared to have greatest impact on non-leasers and small 
leasers-in. Non-leasers became active in the lease market in greater numbers during 
the period of stock decline than the period of stock growth. Non-leasers transited to 
become small leasers-out (t=3.05, p<0.01) and small leasers-in (t=2.28, p=0.03) (Fig. 
3.7a). In the opposite direction transitions also occurred, where small leasers-in left 
the quota lease market to become non-leasers.  This transition from small leaser-in to 
non-leaser was higher during the period of stock decline than during the period of stock 
growth (t=2.84, p<0.01).  
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Figure 3.7. Transition rate amongst different levels of quota leasing (A) during the 
periods of stock growth/decline, and (B) for three levels of quota ownership. 
Significant differences in transition rates through leasing states at the three ownership 
levels: (i) low-high t=4.48 (p<0.010), medium-high t=2.66 (p=0.012); (ii) small-large 
t=4.29 (p<0.010), medium-large t=3.29 (p<0.010); (iii) small-medium t=3.32 
(p=0.025), small-large t=2.94 (p<0.010), medium-large t=2.54 (p=0.014) and (iv) 
small-medium t=2.63 (p=0.014), small-large t=6.04 (p<0.010) and medium-large 
t=4.62 (p<0.010). No significant differences found in transition rate amongst 
ownership levels not numbered. 
 
The level of quota ownership affected almost 50% of the transitions between different 
states of quota leasing. Apparently, operators tried to reach a balance between owned 
and leased quotas. For instance, there was a significant decrease in the transition rate 
from small leaser-in to large leaser-in while quota ownership was high (Fig. 3.7b). In 
other words, operators were less likely to lease additional quotas if they owned a large 
number of quota units. Operators were also more likely to lease quotas units out when 
they owned greater number of units. Thus, operators who transited from being a large 
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leaser-in to small leaser-in showed a significative decrease in the transition rate when 
the number of owned quotas was low. 
 
There did not appear consistent pattern in the transition between the rate of quota 
leasing and the efficiency of quota owners as indicated by their CPUE.  Large quota 
owners, who had a significantly higher CPUE than small operators during the year 
before to move to other estate (t=3.23, p<0.01, Table 3.2), had a higher transition when 
moving from being a non-leaser to a small leaser-in (t=4.29, p<0.01) (Fig. 3.7b).  This 
result indicated that the expected higher transition of leased in quotas by more efficient 
operators was met. However, this pattern did not apply for the remainder of the quota 
owners involved in the quota lease market. For instance, with respect to quota that is 
leased out, small quota owners had a significantly higher transition rate than large 
quota owners when moving from non-leaser to being a small leaser-out (t=4.48, 
p<0.01) (Fig. 3.7b). However, small quota owners who leased out had significantly 
lower CPUE than large quota owners who leased out (t=6.80, p<0.01). In this case, the 
results suggested that quotas were transiting to less efficient operators.  
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Table 3.2. Average CPUE of quota owners for small, medium and large quota 
ownership the year before transiting for different leasing states. Standard deviation in 
parentheses. T test between small and large ownership. 
Transition (from→to) 
 Quota ownership  
t p-value 
 Small Medium Large  
Non-leasers→small leasers-out 
 0.54(0.19) 1.00(0.34) 1.20(0.34)  6.80 <0.010 
Small leasers-out→non-leasers 
 0.73(0.28) 0.91(0.41) 1.05(0.26)  2.79 0.011 
Small leasers-out→large leasers-out 
 0.66(0.54) 0.87(0.43) 1.20(0.63)  3.85 <0.010 
Large leasers-out→small leasers-out 
 0.51(0.41) 0.93(0.42) 1.08(0.66)  3.64 <0.010 
Non-leasers→small leasers-in 
 0.70(0.10) 0.97(0.54) 1.09(0.30)  3.23 <0.010 
Small leasers-in→non-leasers 
 1.03(0.63) 0.89(0.36) 1.03(0.25)  0.48 0.637 
Small leasers-in →large leasers-in 
 0.67(0.19) 1.03(0.27) 1.19(0.46)  5.17 <0.010 
Large leasers-in→small leasers-in 
 0.69(0.33) 1.02(0.30) 1.30(0.39)  5.55 <0.010 
Small leasers-in→small leasers-out 
 0.39(0.04) 1.03(0.61) 1.18(0.52)  12.91 <0.010 
 
 
Transition of quota units to more efficient operators  
The expected Granger-causal relation between efficiency as measured by CPUE and 
quota ownership/number of fished quotas was observed during the period of stock 
growth but was absent during the period of stock decline (Table 3.3). In other words, 
operators who were more efficient owned/fished more quota units during the period of 
growth, but this did not hold during the period of decline. In addition, a Granger-causal 
relation was also found in the direction from ownership/number of fished quotas to 
CPUE during both periods (Table 3.3). This is to say, operators owning and fishing a 
larger number of quota units are more likely to be more technically efficient. A second 
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proxy used for efficiency was fishing experience (number of years operation in the 
fishery) and this did not Granger-cause levels of quota ownership or number of fished 
quotas during both periods. Therefore, any experience gained through the time 
operating in the fishery did not ensure a higher ownership or a higher scale of 
operation. The results also showed that the number of quota units owned Granger-
caused the number of quotas units fished and not the other way around, during both 
periods (Table 3.3). This meant that operators who owned a large number of quota 
units were more likely to increase their scale of operation, but operators who fished a 
large number of quota units did not necessarily increase their ownership. 
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Table 3.3. Results of the Wald test to establish causality and find proof that changes 
in one variable “caused” changes in another variable. “Causes”= “Granger-causes”. 
Hypothesis 
Stock growth period  Stock decline period 
W p-value Granger causality? † 
 W p-value Granger causality? † 
Changes in CPUE 
efficiency  “causes” 
changes in quota ownership 
9.53 0.039 Yes 
 
4.26 0.422 No 
Changes in quota 
ownership  “causes” 
changes in CPUE 
efficiency 
38.39 <0.001 Yes 
 
20.32 <0.001 Yes 
Changes in experience  
“causes” changes in quota 
ownership 
0.09 0.914 No 
 
0.55 0.650 No 
Changes in CPUE 
efficiency “causes” changes 
in number of fished quotas 
14.29 0.003 Yes 
 
6.16 0.089 No 
Changes in number of 
fished quotas “causes” 
changes in CPUE 
efficiency 
65.69 <0.001 Yes 
 
30.82 <0.001 Yes 
Changes in quota 
ownership “causes” 
changes in number of 
fished quotas 
6.78 <0.001 Yes 
 
3.76 0.011 Yes 
Changes in number of 
fished quotas “causes” 
changes in quota ownership 
4.90 0.311 No 
 
0.67 0.946 No 
† At 95% of significance.  
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3.5. Discussion 
ITQ systems are intended to increase economic efficiency through fleet rationalization 
and also provide incentives to manage harvests conservatively (Grafton et al. 2000; 
Costello et al. 2008; Kompas et al. 2009). To deliver these changes, ITQ systems 
require a functional quota market that reflects changes in rent from the fishery due to 
changes in stock abundance (Newell et al. 2005; Grafton et al. 2006), and facilitate 
quota transfers to technically efficient operators. The results of this study revealed that 
during the period of stock decline quota transfers were not necessarily a consequence 
of technical and economic efficiency; instead, technical and economic efficiency were 
a result of the financial capacity of operators, measured in terms of quota ownership 
and number of fished quotas. There are other potential exogenous factors not examined 
here that could also affect transition rates and would be of interest for further research. 
For example, quota ownership and the scale of operation may respond to changes in 
price, labour costs, and integration between processors and fishing operations.   
 
The quota sale market showed a higher level of activity during periods of stock growth, 
which was evident in the change of the fishery’s ownership structure. Some of the 
medium quota owners reduced ownership while others with a high catch level (through 
both owned and leased quota) acquired additional units in the quota market to become 
large owners. Higher rent signalled through higher catch rate (Newell et al. 2005), and 
higher quota value achieved by sound TACs (Arnason 1990), were incentives to buy 
additional quota units for medium quota owners. This group of medium quota owners 
were more able to afford additional quota units and increase the scale of their 
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operation; thereby increasing their rent by reducing quota lease cost. They can also 
become income supplementers or investors, by leasing out a fraction of their total 
number of quota units (van Putten and Gardner 2010).  
 
Like medium size quota owners, small quota owners responded to the incentives 
produced by higher catch rates during period of stock growth, showing a high 
transition rate from small to medium size quota owners. Small quota owners have 
pressure to increase their ownership relative to the number of quota units that are 
leased in, because the lease cost is a large proportion of the value of the catch. During 
the period of stock growth, the leasing price increased as a percentage of the ex-vessel 
value of the catch from 40% in 2001 to 64% in 2005 (Emery et al. 2014b). This was a 
strong incentive for small quota owners to find mechanisms to finance new quota units 
and reduce lease costs, thus increasing the probability they could stay financially 
viable and remain in the fishery.  
 
Quota market activity fell during the period of stock decline with fewer permanent 
transfers and stability in the number of quota owners in most ownership groups. 
Through this declining stock period active owners appeared to have less incentive to 
increase quota ownership because of lower profit expectations signals from lower 
catch rates. In the TRLF fishers generally adjust their daily effort according to changes 
in the expected catch rates, particularly during a period of stock decline (Emery et al. 
2014a). In addition, during the period of stock decline there was less incentive to trade 
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quota for income supplementers or investors because lease price fell. This fall in lease 
price is particularly dramatic if the TAC is set too high and becomes non-limiting. 
Therefore, at those times there was less incentive for active quota owners to buy 
additional quota units and take the risk of not being able to catch this additional quota.  
There was also less incentive for income supplementers or investors to lease out quotas 
due to the low price.  
 
Despite the reduced activity in the quota market during the period of stock decline, 
small quota owners had a high rate of ownership increase. Regardless of low catch 
expectations, some bought additional quotas and increased their holdings while the 
quota unit price was low.  In this case, small operators increased ownership 
overcoming usual barriers such as asymmetric market information and competition 
with larger quota owners with a higher bargaining power (McEvoy et al. 2009; 
Pinkerton and Edwards 2009).  
 
Quota markets in ITQ systems are expected to facilitate quota units transiting from 
less to more efficient operators (Uchida et al. 2004) creating an overall reduction in 
cost through fleet rationalization (Arnason 1993; Newell et al. 2005). In the TRLF, the 
Granger causality test indicated that changes in the ownership and number of fished 
quota were linked to the technical efficiency of fishers during the period of stock 
growth, but this ‘causal’ effect was not found during the period of stock decline.  Fleet 
rationalization occurred at the beginning of the stock growth period, when the number 
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of active vessel declined by 25% from 325 in 1997 to 242 in 2000 (Hamon et al. 2009; 
Hartmann et al. 2013). This was driven by an overall increase in stock and it was 
reflected in the ‘causal’ relation between the individual technical efficiency and the 
number of owned and fished quotas.  Although technical efficiency seemed to affect 
changes in quota ownership and number of fished quotas, one interesting trend that 
was apparent from Granger causality was that operators who owned a large number of 
quota units were more likely to increase their ownership and number of fished quotas 
further, during both periods. This suggested their ability to expand ownership was due 
to their larger financial capacity, which has affected changes in ownership elsewhere 
(Sumaila and Watson 2002; Pinkerton and Edwards 2009).  
 
Exit from the fishery was also related to the financial capacity of operators in terms of 
owned quotas rather than their technical efficiency. In the Tasmanian RLF, operators 
fishing less than 25 quota units are not able to remain in the fishery even in the short 
term because of a lower accounting profit (van Putten and Gardner 2010). Therefore, 
small quota owners tried to increase their accounting profit leasing in additional 
quotas; however, the leasing cost lowered their accounting profit. Consequently, they 
were more likely to exit the fishery than other categories of fisher.  This trend has been 
observed in other fisheries and can be moderated by levels of debt (Davidson 2010). 
Thus, any cost reduction as a result of higher technical efficiency measured in terms 
of CPUE could not offset the significant cost of leasing in extra quotas. 
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Like the quota sale market, the quota lease market also responded to stock changes. 
During the stock growth period, there were increases in the number of participants and 
increases in the connectivity of the lease market with trades occurring through a wider 
network (van Putten and Gardner 2010). The participation of small leasers-in fell as 
the stock and lease price grew, especially between 2004 and 2006 when the lease quota 
price had risen by 62% from initial levels. This suggested that the small leasers-in 
group had a lower financial capacity and were less able to compete in the lease quota 
market as prices rose. In contrast, large leasers-in grew through the period of stock 
growth (2000-2006). This pattern in the lease market was consistent with our results 
from the ‘causal’ effect of quota ownership on number of fished quotas, which also 
drove patterns in the TRLF fleet during stock growth between 2001 and 2007, which 
showed quota concentration (Emery et al. 2014a).  
 
The quota lease market behaved differently according to trends in the stock and was 
moderated by the financial capacity of operators, as indicated by their level of leased 
quotas.  This observation was also apparent in the absence of a ‘causal’ link between 
technical efficiency and number of fished quotas. Therefore, the composition of 
participants changed as the stock declined. There was a decline in the number of large 
leasers-out, who dominated during the period of stock growth, and there was an 
increase in participation by operators who had previously not been active in the lease 
market. This was consistent with a pattern of a large fleet and less concentration of 
catch during stock decline (Emery et al. 2014a).   
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3.6. Conclusion 
The quota market in the TRLF responded to changes in stock abundance that occurred 
because of temporal fluctuations in recruitment (Linnane et al. 2010a), with a larger 
number of permanent quota transfers during the period of stock growth and a lower 
number as stocks declined. At times of stock growth, when expectations of future 
profit were high, quota owners increased the scale of operation, and/or became 
investors or income supplementers.  The permanent transfer of quota units in this 
fishery was not connected to the quota owners’ technical efficiency, but was driven by 
their financial capacity and to a lower extent by their scale of operation. Similarly, 
exiting the fishery was not associated with the fishers’ technical efficiency, but their 
financial capacity - those who owned fewer quotas were more likely to exit the fishery. 
These outcomes were not consistent with one of the intended outcomes of ITQ 
systems, which is to increase the technical efficiency of the fleet through transfer of 
quota units between operators in a market. 
 
Trends in stock abundance also affected trade in the quota lease market. In this market, 
there was no reduction in overall leasing activity during periods of stock decline 
although the activity of different categories of fisher changed. Lease quota units 
transited towards operators with a higher financial capacity and not necessarily toward 
those who were more technically efficient. When the stock declined the composition 
of participants changed, with a decline in operators who leased a large number of 
quotas units and an increase in operators who leased a small number of units. 
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This research shows that temporary and permanent quota markets are complex and can 
be affected by temporal patterns in stock recruitment and productivity.  Consequently, 
unexpected changes in the stock, together with the heterogeneity in business structures 
between operators in the fleet may result in changes different from that expected from 
ITQ theory. Periods of stock decline resulted in fleet renewal and expansion rather 
than accumulation and concentration.  Further, the trades made in the quota sale and 
quota lease markets did not result in a shift in catch towards operators with greater 
technical efficiency. 
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Chapter 4  
Changes in leasing network of 
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4.1. Abstract 
Good decisions on stock management in individual transferable quota (ITQ) systems 
are rewarded in markets where quota units are transferred to more efficient operators. 
These markets are expected to respond to variations in economic rent from the fishery, 
which in turn are influenced by stock abundance and external factors such as exchange 
rates and price. This research used a social network approach to examine the 
functioning of the quota lease market functionality in the Tasmanian rock lobster 
fishery, during periods of both increasing and decreasing stock abundance. The 
influence of operational fishing factors on operators’ connectedness, and the influence 
of connectedness on the success of operators in terms of quota balance and profit, was 
examined using linear mixed effect modelling. When the stock biomass increased, 
operators increased their one-way or reciprocal trade connections with the result that 
the complexity of their trade network increased. The connectedness of active operators 
was mostly influenced by their fishing operation characteristics, while quota 
ownership was the main factor in the case of investors. Different dimension of social 
capital influenced success in the fishery for active operators and investors. The 
response of operators to changes in stock recruitment and productivity was variable 
and mainly affected by business structure, financial characteristics, and bargaining 
capacity. 
 
Keywords: Network analysis, connectedness, market functionality, ITQ  
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4.2. Introduction 
 
The economic benefits of Individual Transferable Quota (ITQ) systems are derived 
from reductions in cost, through the elimination of wasteful effort, higher catch rates, 
and market-based rewards for good decision making on stock management (Grafton 
et al. 2000; Costello et al. 2008). When governments make sound decisions setting the 
Total Allowable Catch (TAC), higher profitability expectations should be reflected in 
both permanent quota sales and temporary quota lease prices (Arnason 1990; Batstone 
and Sharp 2003; Newell et al. 2005). This is thought to align industry’s interest with 
long-term fishery management objectives, which makes it easier for governments to 
make responsible decisions.  
 
Quota prices and markets are thus critical to achieving the theoretical benefits of 
providing industry incentives with ITQs. Quota markets facilitate permanent and 
temporary transfers of quota units to operators with lower fishing costs. 
Simultaneously, high quota sale prices in quota markets may provide incentives for 
operators with high fishing costs to exit the fishery.  
 
Permanent and temporary transfers of quota units in an ITQ market are influenced by 
a number of factors, such as availability and cost of relevant information to make 
trading decisions (e.g. price and availability of quota units, number of agents trading, 
etc.) as well as the transaction costs between operators (Rose 2002). Ultimately 
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functioning of the market for quota is critical but this may fail to result in transfer of 
quota transfers to more efficient operators for many reasons, including heterogeneity 
amongst operators in bargaining power, transaction cost barriers, and inaccessibility 
of market information (Stavins 1995; Anderson 2008). The influence of these factors 
may be affected by the structure and dynamics of connections amongst trading partners 
in a market. Therefore, market functionality may be explored by analysing the trade 
network created by market participants and their trading connections. Trade networks 
also reflect the social interactions in markets, which are known to alter the economic 
behaviour of operators (Podolny 2001; Fligstein and Dauter 2007; Bögenhold 2013; 
Jackson 2014).   
 
Social networks, together with norms of trust and reciprocity, are important 
components of social capital (Grafton 2005). Social network is a multi-dimension 
concept that included both structure of social connections and the quality of these 
connections amongst actors. Thus, on the basis of an actor’s social connectedness, an 
actor may be rewarded for being connected with other actors in a network (Portes 
1998). Chances of success are increased when the number of connections also 
increases, as the opportunities and capacities are enhanced. Thus, in the context of ITQ 
markets, operators that are well connected with others may be expected to have greater 
ability to access quota when they wish to make changes to their business to maximize 
their profit. This means that a higher level of connectedness may lead to higher 
individual profit (Turner et al. 2014), and from a collective point of view it may lead 
to a higher market functionality and lower rent dissipation (Innes et al. 2014). Social 
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network is formally split into three categories: bridging, linking, and bonding social 
capital (Woolcock 2001). Bridging involves connection between similar but different 
groups, and linking involves with connections between disparate groups with different 
hierarchies. The last category, bonding social capital, refers to connections amongst 
individuals within groups, was the focus of the analysis conducted here and hereinafter 
referred as connectedness.  
 
This research was focused on the lease quota trade market of Tasmanian rock lobster 
fishery (TRLF), which has operated under an ITQ management system since 1998. 
The TAC is set annually and distributed equally between 10,507 quota units. Markets 
for both sale and temporary lease of quota units have developed with both the number 
of participants and the number of transactions increasing through time (van Putten et 
al. 2011). This fishery went through an initial period of rapid stock rebuilding during 
which biomass and catch rates increased after the introduction of the ITQ system in 
1998 until 2006, stock growth period (Fig. 3.1). Over this period, the TAC was entirely 
caught and quota lease prices rose (Gardner et al. 2011).  In the following years the 
trend reversed and performance indicators steadily decreased as a result of a period of 
low recruitment (Linnane et al. 2010c), we refer to this as the stock decline period. 
The TAC was under-caught in some years and catch rate decreased by 34.2% from 
2006 to 2011. This decline was also reflected in a declining lease quota price (Gardner 
et al. 2011).   
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Stock declines that have occurred since 2006 provided a perturbation to this market. 
Uncertainty around future catches and associated higher fishing costs is known to lead 
to operators changing their trading behaviour (Lindner et al. 1992), which may be 
reflected in their lease quota trade connections. Change in lease trading relative to 
stock biomass was examined here with a social network approach. 
 
4.3. Methods 
Data 
Quota trading data for the TRLF was compiled from a database maintained by the 
Department of Primary Industries, Parks, Water and Environment (DPIPWE) of the 
Tasmanian Government. Data from 2000 to 2012 comprised information on quota 
transactions: who leased (in/out) to whom, number of quota units owned and held 
(owned +leased in - leased out quotas) per fisher at the end of every fishing season. 
The number of leased in/out quota units per fisher per year was derived by subtracting 
the number of quota units owned from the number of quota units held. Positive values 
represented the number of quotas leased in while negative values represented the 
number of quotas leased out.  
 
Additional covariates were obtained from the database or stock assessments of the 
fishery (Hartmann et al. 2012) to assess their relationship with the changes in the 
structure of the lease quota trade network. Fishery-based covariates were average 
annual catch per unit effort (CPUE; kg per pot lift), biomass (exploitable biomass, ton) 
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and recruitment (total number of puerulus) as a proxy for stock status. Operator-based 
covariates were the individual CPUE, annual individual catch (as a fraction of weight 
of held quota, in kg), fished quota (weight of held quota as a fraction of the TAC), 
overall length (m) of vessels and quota ownership (weight of owned quota as a fraction 
of the TAC). 
 
Changes in trading in the lease quota trading network 
Changes in the lease quota market network was examined by mapping each fishing 
season where vertices (nodes) represented operators leasing quota units, and edges 
(ties) represented temporary lease quota exchanges between operators. Both vertices 
and edges had attributes; for example, the number of owned quota units was a vertex 
attribute and the number of units transferred between two vertices was an edge 
attribute. Operator-based covariates were used as vertices’ attributes. The annual lease 
quota trade network maps took into account the direction of quota transfers; thus, some 
vertices had edges coming in, out or both when actors leased in, out or both in and out 
respectively. From each annual network, information about the network structure and 
operator connections was extracted calculating an annual average of vertex and 
network-based statistical standardized indicators (Table 4.1), which were estimated 
using the R package igraph (Csárdi and Nepusz 2006).  
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Table 4.1. Statistical network indicators. 
Dimension Statistical 
indicator 
Definition  Description 
 Density Ratio of the number of edges in the network 
over the total number of potential edges.  
 A well connected network has a high density. In a lease quota market this implies that 
operators are trading with a large number of operators who are also trading with a large 
number of other operators. Thus it is more likely that they are able to lease in/out required 
quota.  
     
Network Average path 
length 
Average of the shortest path between every 
vertex pair with the minimal number of 
vertices between them.  
 Average distance between any two operators. Networks where the path length is long means 
that an individual needs to pass through many others to interact with a given individual. 
High values are more frequent in networks with less randomness.  
     
 Diameter The longest distance between the shortest 
paths with two connected vertices.   
 Indicates how long it will takes to reach any vertex in the network. This indicator has a 
similar interpretation to the average path length.  
 Degree 
centrality 
Number of edges associated with a vertex, 
with in-degree when the vertex receives the 
information and out-degree when this 
delivers the information. 
 Number of operators who a quota owner trades with. In-degree is the number of trades 
where an operator leases in quota units and out-degree where an operator leases out units. 
An operator with a high in-degree value leases quota from a large number of suppliers. This 
enriches their connectedness, as a high number of connections increase the probability of 
being able to trade all desired quota. Likewise, an operator with a high out-degree has high 
probability of leasing out desired quota.  
Vertex     
 Between-ness 
centrality 
Extent to which a vertex is located between 
other pairs of vertices. 
 Indicates the probability that an operator is on the most direct route between other two 
operators. Usually, operators with high betweenness are in the path between two or more 
groups of operators that are well-connected. Thus their role in the network is to create a 
bridge to other operators on the shortest path.      
     
 Eigenvector 
centrality 
Extent to which a vertex is connected to 
others well connected vertices. 
 This indicator is a measure of whether an operator is a “big fish” connected with other “big 
fish” in the network. Operators with high eigenvector scores have many connections and are 
connected with other operators who also have many connections. It is likely that they have 
high financial capital, own and trade large number of quotas, and are likely to succeed in the 
market.  
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The influence of the stock status on the network structure was explored modelling the 
annual average CPUE, the exploitable biomass and recruitment (total estimated 
number of puerulus) versus annual network indicators (network density, average path 
length and network diameter). Lease quota price was also used as it is expected to 
respond to stock status in a well-functioning market (Arnason 1990). In each case 
interactions were explored. Linear models were fitted using Generalized Least Squares 
(GLS), to take into account autocorrelation between years (Zuur et al. 2009).   
 
Connectedness and market functionality 
The operators’ connectedness was determined from statistical indicators of each 
operator (in/out degree, betweenness and eigenvector). The balance between 
operators’ annual owned and leased in/out quota was used to assess the efficiency of 
the TRL lease quota trade market. In a functional quota system, operators cover their 
catch with quota that they own and also by leasing in/out units as required.  
Additionally, the operators’ annual profit was used to measure market efficiency, 
because this was influenced by their balance of quota. To examine differences amongst 
operators, operators were first classified using a typology simplified from van Putten 
and Gardner (2010): (i) active operators, who fished and traded quota in the lease 
market, and (ii) investors, who did not fish but were involved in quota trades in this 
market. The effect of characteristics of operators on connectedness was also modelled 
using variables of individual CPUE, catch, overall vessel length, and held and owned 
quota.  
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Finally, the effect of operators’ connectedness on market functionality (annual quota 
balance and profit) was also modelled. Quota balance for active operators was the ratio 
between landings and the number of held quota (owned + bought + leased in – sold – 
leased out quota) (Innes et al. 2014). For investors, this was the ratio between leased 
out and the sum of owned + bought + leased in – sold quotas.  The profit of active 
operators was calculated by the product of individual catch and the average price paid 
by processor minus an average total cost per potlift, AU$30 taken from a previous 
survey (van Putten and Gardner 2010), and an average annual lease quota price 
(AU$/kg) provided by a quota broker (M. Atkins). As no estimates of transaction costs 
were available for investors, the revenue from quota leased out was simply the total 
lease price times the number of held quota.  
 
Models were fitted using Linear Mixed Effect Modelling (LMM) given that the data 
was organized as panels (Hoff 2003; van Duijn et al. 2004; Westveld and Hoff 2011). 
As the measurements were repeated, operators showed autocorrelation, and as the 
operators interacted with each other, there was also correlation amongst them. 
Therefore, fishing seasons and operators were considered as random effects. 
Interaction between explanatory variables were explored and modelling was carried 
out using the R package nlme (Pinheiro et al. 2014). 
 
For each model, a McFadden’s pseudo R2 was calculated, which values ranging 
between 0.2 and 0.4 are considered to be indicative of very good model fits (Louviere 
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et al. 2000). It was showed through simulation that this range of pseudo R2 is 
equivalent to a range of 0.7 to 0.9 for a linear function (Domenicich and McFadden 
1975).   
 
4.4. Results 
Changes of lease quota trade network 
The lease quota trade network in TRL fishery had structural variation between the two 
stock status periods (Fig. 4.1). During the period of stock growth the number of lease 
trade connections amongst operators increased. There was a trend of increasing 
network density that extended until the second year of the period of stock decline but 
with a period of lower network density immediately before the stock declined in 2006. 
Network density peaked in 2008 when the stock was in rapid decline. Network density 
slightly increased again in 2011 and 2012 when the stock remained depleted. Given 
high values of average path length and diameter, the lease quota network appeared to 
decrease the degree of randomness between the end of the periods of stock growth and 
the beginning of the stock decline period. For instance, the average path length and 
diameter of the network remained relatively constant at lower values during almost the 
entire period of stock growth. Greatest change in these two statistical indicators 
occurred between 2005 and 2010 with a maximum in 2008. The maximum value of 
each statistical indicator was reached in the second year of the stock decline period 
(Fig. 4.1). Biomass and CPUE were still high at this time relative to 2011 and 2012, 
however the lease quota price was in a downward trend (Fig. 3.1). Thus, the statistical 
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indicators showed significant higher mean values during the period of stock decline 
(Table 4.2), which is result of the large values during the three first years.  
 
Figure 4.1. Annual averages for network-level statistical indicators. The indicators 
were standardized by the respective maximum value.  
 
Lease quota price, biomass (total), and CPUE significantly affected the structure of the 
network while no significant effect was observed for exploitable biomass, mature 
biomass or recruitment. Values of pseudo R2 ranged between 0.25 and 0.47 meaning 
that independent variables in the models explained between 22% and 47% of statistical 
network indicators.  
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Table 4.2. Generalized least model outputs from indicators of the quota lease trade 
network and variables that describe the stock status. Price = lease quota price, Period 
= contrast between stock growth and decline periods, R2 = McFadden's pseudo R2. 
Variable   Coefficient  t-value 
 
p-value 
 
R2 
 Response  Explanatory   Value Std. Error  
Density 
 
(Intercept)   0.093 0.267  0.348 0.735  
Period  -0.310 0.086  -3.600 0.005 0.474 
Biomass  0.958 0.354  2.708 0.022  
Density 
 
(Intercept)  0.659 0.076  8.652 <0.001 0.216 
 CPUE  0.200 0.091  2.203 0.050 
Average  
path length 
 
(Intercept)  -1.169 0.428  -2.731 0.021 
0.257 
 
Period   -0.802 0.140  -5.729 <0.001 
Biomass  2.496 0.567  4.401 0.001 
Average  
path length 
 
(Intercept)  -5.835 2.629  -2.220 0.054 
-0.273 
 
 
Biomass   8.508 3.496  2.434 0.038 
Price 8.017 2.772  2.893 0.018 
Biomass x Price   -10.641 3.727  -2.855 0.019 
Diameter 
 
 
(Intercept)  -7.156 1.935  -3.699 0.005 
0.395 
 
 
Biomass  10.111 2.490  4.060 0.003 
Price  8.532 1.829  4.666 0.001 
Biomass x Price  -11.424 2.454  -4.656 0.001 
 
Biomass and CPUE positively influenced network density with greatest effect from 
biomass, as inferred from both pseudo R2 and regression coefficients (Table 4.2).  The 
interaction between biomass and lease quota price indicated that when both were high 
the path length and diameter were low. This was apparent from the low values of 
average path length and diameter during the period of stock growth, when biomass and 
quota price values were high. Also, both network statistics were low when biomass 
and quota price were low at the end of the period of stock decline (Fig. 4.1). This 
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interaction also revealed that path length and diameter reached high values when the 
biomass was declining and the quota price was still relatively high. This scenario was 
evident during the first three years of the stock declining period.    
 
At an operator (vertex) -level there were also differences between both stock status 
periods (Fig. 4.2). The annual average of the indicators in-degree, betweenness and 
eigenvector, showed a downward trend during the first three seasons of the period of 
stock growth, with a slightly increasing trend in the in-degree and betweenness indices, 
and a relatively stable pattern in eigenvector values during the rest of the period. The 
out-degree indicator remained constant during this whole period. Then, in the period 
of stock decline each indicator reached a peak between 2007 and 2009. The downward 
trend after the peak reversed in 2011, evident in eigenvector values. These trends 
reflected initial adjustments of connections (transactions) amongst operators in the 
lease quota market, and a posterior response to increase and decrease the stock 
abundance. 
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Figure 4.2. Annual averages for statistical indicators at the operator level. The 
indicators were standardized by the respective maximum value. Shaded zone represent 
confidence intervals. 
 
Connectedness and market functionality 
Connectedness (as measured by trading connections) was influenced by operational 
characteristics of size (level) of operation and quota ownership (Table 4.3), and in turn, 
connectedness influenced operators’ level of economic achievement (as measured by 
quota balance and profit) (Table 4.4), which implied market functionality. In general, 
connectedness for active operators (as defined by the in- and out-degree – or the 
number of trade connections) was related to the size of their operations; specifically 
vessel length, and the number of held quotas units interacting with catch (Table 4.3). 
There was a distinction between the effect of in-degree (leasing quota in) and out-
degree (leasing quota out) on the operator’s connectedness. The actual level of 
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operation (the product of catch level and held quotas) was high for operators with a 
high number of leasing-in connections (in-degree) and vice versa for operators with a 
high number of leasing-out connections (out-degree). 
 
Another aspect of connectedness of operators was whether they were well-connected 
to other well connected operators (as measured by the eigenvector). The operator’s 
eigenvectors were affected by the level of catch and the quota ownership (as opposed 
to quota fished). More active operators, with a high level of catch, tended to be less 
connected with other well-connected operators (indicated by the negative sign on the 
coefficient in Table 4.3). In contrast when operators had a higher level of quota 
ownership they were connected with well-connected operators. For investors, the 
eigenvector was the only network dimension that could be modelled.  The investor’s 
connectedness (as measured by the eigenvector) was positively influenced when quota 
ownership was high but was negatively affected when the number of untraded quota 
units (held quotas) was high.     
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Table 4.3. Linear mixed model outputs that described the relation between statistical 
network indicators that describe the operators’ connectedness and variables that 
describe the operators’ level of activity and ownership. R2 = McFadden's pseudo R2. 
Operator 
typology 
Variable  Coefficient 
 t-value 
 
p-value 
 
R2 
 Response Explanatory  Value Std. Error 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Active 
operator 
In-degree 
 
 
(Intercept)  1.349 0.284 4.754 <0.001 
0.303 
 
 
Vessel length  0.061 0.016 3.749 <0.001 
Catch  0.007 0.004 1.690 0.091 
Held quotas  0.012 0.033 0.371 0.711 
Catch x Held quotas  0.315 0.020 15.631 <0.001 
Out-degree 
 
 
 
(Intercept)  3.459 0.377 9.182 <0.001 
0.355 
 
 
Vessel length  0.159 0.021 7.545 <0.001 
Catch  -0.008 0.006 -1.539 0.124 
Held quotas  -0.036 0.043 -0.830 0.407 
Catch x Held quotas  -0.145 0.026 -5.564 <0.001 
Eigenvector 
 
(Intercept)  0.566 0.082 6.931 <0.001 
0.332 
 
Catch  -0.025 0.013 -1.967 0.049 
Owned quotas  0.020 0.008 2.367 0.018 
 
Investor Eigenvector 
 
(Intercept)  0.057 0.008 6.931 <0.001 
0.248 
 
Owned quotas  0.002 0.001 2.367 0.018 
Held quotas  -0.003 0.001 -1.967 0.049 
 
Looking at the lease trade connections in another way, the network statistics that are a 
measure of operators and investors connectedness can also be used to explain their 
profitability and quota balance, which in turn is measure of market functionality. The 
quota balance and profit for active operators was positively affected by a high in-
degree (leasing quota units in), but the profit was reduced where there was a high out-
degree (leasing quota units out) (Table 4.4). In addition, when active operators were 
connected with well-connected operators (eigenvector) their quota balance and profit 
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was reduced. Conversely, investors increased their quota balance and revenue when 
they were connected with well-connected operators (indicated by the positive sign on 
the coefficient for the eigenvector).  
 
Table 4.4. Linear mixed model outputs that described the relation between statistical 
network indicators that describe the operators’ connectedness and variables that 
describe the operators’ annual level of success in the fishery (and profit). R2 = 
McFadden's pseudo R2. 
Operator 
typology 
Variable   Coefficient   
t-value p-value R2 
 Response Explanatory  Value Std. Error   
Active 
operators 
Quota 
balance  
 
(Intercept)  0.570 0.114  4.984 0.570 
0.462  
In-degree  0.177 0.017  10.692 0.177 
Out-degree  -0.040 0.014  -2.930 -0.040 
Eigenvector  -1.343 0.480  -2.799 -1.343 
Profit  
(Intercept)  16.697 8.974   1.861 0.063 
 0.397  
In-degree  14.388 0.842  17.078 <0.001 
Out-degree  -15.564 0.698  -2.229 0.026 
Eigenvector  -75.829 24.515   -3.093 0.002 
Investors 
Quota 
balance 
(Intercept)  0.515 0.022  23.200 <0.001 
0.413 
Eigenvector  0.582 0.105  5.537 <0.001 
Revenue 
(Intercept)  62.587 5.081  12.318 <0.001 
 0.386 
Eigenvector  34.548 11.730   2.945 0.003 
 
Connectedness indicators explained between 39% and 46% the variability of indicator 
of market functionality (quota balance and profit). Betweenness was also evaluated, 
but this did not show significant influence on any market functionality indicator, and 
neither did any of the possible interactions.  
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4.5. Discussion 
The economic outcomes of ITQ systems occur through fleet rationalization and 
market-based rewards when stock are managed conservatively (Grafton et al. 2000; 
Costello et al. 2008; Kompas et al. 2009, 2011). Fundamental to these potential 
economic benefits is an effective and functional quota market that facilitates 
permanent and temporary (lease) quota transfer amongst operators. Market 
functionality may be influenced by operators’ trade connections  (Innes et al. 2014), 
which in turn are influenced by operational characteristics of the operators. The results 
of this research show that lease quota trading activity increased in the lease quota 
market during a period of stock growth, but trading activities continued to grow until 
two years after the stock started to decline.  
 
Changes observed in the structure of the quota lease trade network were related to 
stock biomass and CPUE. The number of connections amongst operators increased 
while biomass and CPUE also increased and vice versa. Stock rebuilding seemed to 
create an expectation of future catch increase and reduced operators’ perception of 
uncertainties associated with fishing.  During the period of biomass increase, operators 
who depended on leasing in quota units increased their number of trade connections. 
Following the same rationale, a reduction of connections would be expected when 
stock biomass declined although this did not occur until two years after the biomass 
and CPUE began to decline.  This may have been because operators’ did not interpret 
the commencement of decline as a signal of substantial reversal in stock rebuilding.  It 
is also possible that the fact that the TAC was still readily caught was critical. This 
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finding of a delay in behavioural change is not unusual and it has been observed 
elsewhere that resource scarcity does not always act as a driver of change in operators 
connections in a network (Ramirez-Sanchez and Pinkerton 2009). However, in the 
current case the delay between changes in stock abundance and changes in the lease 
quota trade network seemed to be related to the way operators perceived fishing 
uncertainty. For instance, despite the ability of operators to readily observe decline in 
catch rates, their downward adjustment in trading was delayed to the time when the 
TAC was not entirely caught in 2009, which was reflected in decreasing statistical 
network indicators.  
 
Lease quota trade network randomness was also influenced by the lease quota price, 
with a significant statistical relationship with average path length and network 
diameter. These two indicators started to increase at the time when the quota price 
started to decrease. The quota price is critical information for trading by operators and 
should reflect the stock status (Arnason 1990; Batstone and Sharp 2003; Newell et al. 
2005). The reduction of randomness, given higher values of average path length and 
diameter (Watts and Strogatz 1998) seemed to be related with the operators’ decisions 
on quota leasing and affected by the operators’ financial capacity. Operators with an 
apparent lower capacity to negotiate a lease price that lead to a higher profit (lower 
bargaining power), had access to quota units at lower price than would occur in 
conditions of higher competitiveness. A similar result was shown for the TRFL when 
the quota transfer rate amongst operators with different financial capacity was 
analysed (León et al. 2015). This increase in activity of a specific group within the 
network is consistent with the increase in average path length and diameter that 
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indicated reduced randomness. The apparent effect of declining stock on increase of 
activity and number of connections of operators who usually had a lower profile was 
consistent with high eigenvector values. Eigenvectors are connectedness indicators 
that respond to the number of connections with well-connected operators and these 
increased when the lease quota price decreased. This trend of increasing connections 
for smaller trading operators in a less competitive market was consistent with 
observations elsewhere, in that unequal bargaining power is an issue predicted and 
evident in many fisheries (NRC 1999; Pinkerton and Edwards 2009). The number of 
connections eventually plateaued as stock continued to decline, suggesting that active 
operators began to respond more to higher costs from a low CPUE after two 
consecutive years of a non-limiting TAC. Thus, greater access to well-connected 
operators in the lease quota market no longer facilitated increase in trades. 
 
It is important to note that along with operators’ fishing level there are other factors 
that also may explain part of the variance for statistical network indicators, such as 
number of pots, engine power, and skipper experience. Similarly, the variance of 
success in the fishery (quota balance and profit) may also be explained by other factors. 
For example, acquaintance relation amongst operators (Frusher et al. 2003), use of 
brokers (van Putten et al. 2011; Schnettler 2009), participation of processors in the 
market (van Putten et al. 2011) fishing efficiency (Little et al. 2009) and, financial 
capacity and debts (Squires et al. 1995). Low variation in the market functionality 
indicators explained by the statistical network indicators as seen here is not unusual 
with similar results obtained when modelling centrality metrics from a network of 
information flow and fishing success (Turner et al. 2014). Nonetheless, the results 
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showed that connectedness was influenced by the level of fishing activity and in turn 
the connectedness influenced the indicator of success in the fishery that informed about 
market functionality. 
 
Quota balance and profit were lower when active operators had higher levels of 
connections with well-connected operators. This suggests that well-connected 
operators had bargaining power with many alternative operators to lease their quota 
to. Operators with a high number of connections to other well-connected operators 
were also those with higher financial capacity and thus greater bargaining power. This 
situation has been observed when processors become involved in the quota market to 
secure fish delivery and use their financial capacity to improve their bargaining 
position (Pinkerton and Edwards 2009). This was consistent with high quota balance 
and revenues for investors when they showed a high number of links with well-
connected operators. 
 
This study exemplified the importance of monitoring the lease market in an ITQ 
managed fishery, given that changes in the stock size were reflected in the 
connectedness of operators’ trade dynamic. The findings revelled some degree of 
power asymmetry, which may be accounted by managers; thus effectivity of measure 
to avoid concertation may be regularly reviewed, especially when biomass changes 
happen.            
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4.6. Conclusions 
The dynamic and structure of the lease quota trade network changed in response to 
stock abundance that occurred as a result of the interplay between TAC settings and 
recruitment fluctuation (Linnane, et al. 2010). As stock began to decline, operators 
presumably retained expectations of ongoing high catch rates and responded by 
participating in markets, which lead to increase in connections and thus the complexity 
of the lease quota trade network. As catch rates fell further, operators with a 
presumably lower bargaining power responded to decrease in the lease quota price by 
increasing their connections in the network, taking advantage of a less competitive 
market. At the extreme the TAC became non-limiting and financial capacity became 
the primary driver of these operators’ behaviour.  
 
Connectedness that operators developed in the trade network depended on their level 
of fishing activity.  Highly active operators developed more numerous trade linkages, 
acquiring high levels of quota and profit. Operators with low levels of fishing activity 
and high levels of quota ownership, as well as investors with high levels of quota 
ownership, were able to develop connections with well-connected operators. This 
meant that when operators had high financial capacity they more actively traded quota. 
Market functionality was influenced by connectedness, and this this was larger when 
active operators had higher quota balance and profit. This occurred when operators 
were highly connected with other operators; however, quota balance and profit was 
lower when they were linked with well-connected operators. These well connected 
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individuals appeared to have a high level of financial capacity and bargaining power 
as they affected trades for a large number of quota units.  
 
This research shows that operators respond differently to temporal changes in stock 
recruitment and productivity, where their business structure, financial and bargaining 
capacity were the main drivers. These findings give some insight to managers about 
the power asymmetry happening in the lease market, especially at the extreme biomass 
changes, when the effects of a non-limiting catch become critical, and the operator’s 
behaviour changes are more evident.  
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5.1. Abstract 
Individual Transferable Quota (ITQ) systems have been used to control harvests and 
increase fisheries’ economic efficiency; however, they do not eliminate competitive 
fishing which can result in stock and congestion externalities that are especially 
apparent when resources are spatial heterogeneous.  These externalities arise because 
ITQ systems do not control the spatial distribution of effort leaving fishers to 
concentrate their effort in more profitable patches. The potential for cooperative 
behaviour to be used to reduce this congestion was explored using an experimental 
economics approach in the context of management of a stock enhancement program 
(SEP). Four treatments were applied involving different systems which were: a 
combination of compulsory, voluntary and by-use payment for the SEP, with either 
open or exclusive access to the enhanced zone (EZ).  Income is either given directly 
to individuals or split between participants through income-sharing (as occurs in 
cooperatives). Voluntary payment to fund the SEP enabled individuals to opt out of 
cooperation, which reduced the enhancement activity and led to a significantly lower 
cooperation than the optimal level and also lower relative to the compulsory payment 
system. Treatments that included a by-use payment combined with exclusive access to 
the EZ were most effective in preventing dissipation of economic rent. The different 
rule settings were affected by participants’ expectations of reciprocity, with greater 
involvement and thus production from the SEP amongst cooperative participants.  
Perceptions of vulnerability were also important, as more self-interested participants 
were more likely to exclude themselves from the SEP. The structure of rules may 
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enable individuals who are more intrinsically cooperative to drive the fishery towards 
a state with low rent dissipation.    
Key words: Cooperation, trust and reciprocity, translocation, quota system, fisheries 
management.  
 
5.2. Introduction  
Individual Transferable Quota (ITQ) systems have successfully reduced the so-called 
“race-to-fish” problem. Given secure and tradeable access to a fraction of the Total 
allowable catch (TAC), fishers have less need to compete for fish so issues such as 
over-capitalization, shortened fishing seasons and lowered quality of products tend to 
be reduced (Grafton et al. 2000; Costello et al. 2008). However, inefficiency and rent 
dissipation may arise nonetheless where some aspect of spatial stock heterogeneity 
creates an incentive to compete. Stocks commonly have patchy distributions and are 
heterogeneous in terms of quality of products (size, consistency of flesh, presence of 
parasites, coloration differences, etc.), productivity, and accessibility (depth and 
proximity to ports), which ultimately manifest as economic heterogeneity (Sanchirico 
and Wilen 1999). Under these conditions, assignment problems may emerge resulting 
in an inefficient use of resources (Ostrom et al. 1994).   
Whether ITQs do not delineate where fishers may harvest their quotas theory predicts 
that fishers will focus their fishing effort on the most profitable patches (Copes 1986; 
Boyce 1992). This will dissipate rent if fishers excessively deplete higher value or 
more productive patches. These patches are analogous to an open access fishing 
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ground within the larger ITQ controlled fishery. Stock heterogeneity may also produce 
congestion externalities, where fishers have an incentive to achieve higher catch rates 
by fishing premium areas before others, leading to competition, gear interference, and 
possible loss of product quality (Costello and Deacon 2007; Holland 2011; Huang and 
Smith 2014). Hence, although ITQs may reduce rent dissipation, they do not eliminate 
it, because fishers continue to act for their individual rather than their collective 
interest.  This means that incentives to coordinate harvests or other aspects of 
cooperation have potential to increase economic yields even where ITQs are present.  
 
There have been several attempts to address management problems derived from 
spatial heterogeneity of stock through coordination of fishing effort. For example, in 
the New England groundfish fishery, the central authority allowed permit holders to 
form voluntary ‘sectors’ (e.g. groups of different fishing gear operators) and receive 
catch allocations for individual species. The sectors were able to manage the level of 
effort, resulting in increasing economic gains (Holland and Wiersma 2010).  Similarly, 
fishers in region three of the New Zealand abalone (Paua) fishery coordinated fishing 
efforts to reduce competition in highly accessible zones, resulting in higher catch rates 
across the whole zone (Costello and Deacon 2007; Deacon and Costello 2008; Deacon 
2012). Another approach used to address the stock and congestion externalities has 
been through arrangements involving pooling of revenues, reduction of costs and 
distribution of profits amongst all operators (Uchida and Baba 2008; Uchida and 
Watanobe 2008). Pooling arrangements can be jointly employed with fishing effort 
coordination leading to significantly higher economic (Uchida 2010).   
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This type of interactions amongst fishers, coordination and cooperation, harvesting 
and stock enhancement decisions can be analysed with game theory and experimental 
economics to explore issues for management of common pool resources (Ostrom et al. 
1994). This enables stakeholders’ behaviour to be assessed to guide managers on likely 
outcomes and necessary incentives when designing management systems (Cárdenas et 
al. 2013). Economic experiments are similar as many scientific experiments where 
systems are simplified, sacrificing some degree of accuracy to enable general 
principles to be understood. The rationales undelaying experimental economics is that 
when management tools are set in an experimental design would influence human 
behaviour at a basic biological and psychological level representative of the real world 
(Kraak 2011). Thus experimental outcomes are generalizable to fisheries rather than a 
specific fishery at one point in time. Experimental economics thus provide a tool to 
explore regulations that promote willingness to support translocation or other forms of 
enhancement and cooperation amongst fishers.  
 
In the Tasmanian rock lobster fishery (TRLF), the effort shifted inshore due to higher 
demand and price for darker red, higher value lobsters that occur in shallower water 
(Ford 2001; Bradshaw 2004). Even though that the fishery is ITQ managed, 
competition between fishers continued to the point that shallow water areas became 
depleted while deep areas were underexploited (Semmens et al. 2006). To deal with 
this issue and based on economic and biological feasibility (Gardner and Van Putten 
2008a,b), the Tasmanian commercial industry translocated lobsters from deep to 
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shallow areas to improve market characteristics and growth (Gardner et al. 2015b). 
This was thus a form of stock enhancement that required payment by fishers to increase 
production so that profits and quota capitalization increased (Green et al. 2012).  
 
The commercial scale translocation operations were financed entirely by the rock 
lobster industry; however, some members were resistant to paying for it despite a high 
return on investment (cost was $3 / extra kg of quota allocated, which the quota owner 
could then lease for around $24 / kg; Gardner et al. 2015b). Despite debate, the 
decision to carry out translocation proceeded through a voting process that led to 
compulsory participation by all fishers. This did not involve intervention by the 
Government authority and there is some evidence that intervention weakens 
willingness to cooperate and reduces stewardship (Bowles 2008; Richter and van Soest 
2011). An alternative approach could have been voluntary payment without any access 
restriction to provide exclusivity to the higher quota allocation that enhancement 
allowed, although the concern was that this would promote free riders. Voluntary 
participation can have benefits however, with evidence that it increases the sense of 
ownership amongst fishers and increases compliance with regulations (Hatcher et al. 
2000; Nielsen 2003; Nielsen and Mathiesen 2003).  
 
Therefore, an economic experiment was conducted here, motivated by and loosely 
structured around commercial rock lobster translocation operations described above, 
to assess management measures that require high level of coordination. These 
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measures included both restricted and unrestricted access treatments to the enhanced 
zone. Additionally, cooperatives were included as a treatment in the experimental 
design with the expectation that they would promote cooperation and stewardship 
(Deacon 2012) and enable members to develop their own regulation (Uchida and Baba 
2008; Uchida and Watanobe 2008).  Based on this history, the following hypotheses 
were formulated: (i) voluntary payment of the translocations would promote more 
cooperation and reciprocity than compulsory payment; (ii) exclusive and secure access 
to the enhanced zone would promote more cooperation and reciprocity than when 
access security is weak; and (iii) having collective profits would result in the highest 
level of cooperation and reciprocity leading to highest economic yield.  
 
5.3. Methods 
Experimental design  
The experiment was designed in the context of an ITQ managed fishery, but quota 
transfers was not accounted to simplify the design. Terminology and the context was 
explained to participants in the overview section of instruction provided before 
running each experimental session (Appendix 5.2). The experimental design set up to 
examine fishers’ motivation for coordination and ability to reach an optimal fishing 
effort allocation in a fishery with spatial stock heterogeneity and enhancement. The 
general framework was a stock enhancement program (SEP) that considered 
restocking a specific zone to address stock heterogeneity by translocating RL from 
other zones. As a result of the translocation there were two zones (i) an enhanced zone 
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(EZ) with potentially higher profitability relative to (ii) a non-enhanced zone (N-EZ). 
Three factors were considered in the experiment.  The first factor was the system for 
Payment of the cost of the SEP with three levels applied: (i) compulsory payment, 
where every participant had to pay for the program; (ii) voluntary payment, where 
participants chose to pay or not, regardless whether they fished their quotas in the EZ; 
and (iii) payment by-use, where fishers had to pay only if they were going to fish in 
the EZ.  The second factor was harvesting-strategy and had two levels applied:  (i) 
individual harvesting, as in an individual quota (IQ) management system; and (ii) 
collective harvesting, as in a community-based management system, with pooling of 
costs and revenue so that profits were shared equally amongst only those operators that 
form part of the collective with exclusive access to the EZ. Finally, the factor of access 
was applied with two levels: (i) access restriction where fishing in the EZ was 
controlled; and (ii) no access restriction to the EZ. Combinations of levels of these 
three factors were referred as treatments, which represented different co-management 
strategies, and were labelled according the type of payment. Hereinafter referred to as 
treatments Compulsory, Voluntary, By-use A and By-use B (Table 5.1). 
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Table 5.1. Combination of treatments in the experimental design. 
Treatment 
label 
Factors 
Participants decision 
Payment Harvesting Access 
restriction 
Compulsory Compulsory Individual No Where to go fishing 
Voluntary Voluntary Individual No Pay for enhancement/ Where to go fishing 
By-use A By use Individual Yes†/No Pay for enhancement/ Where to go fishing 
By-use B By use Individual/Collective‡ Yes†/No Pay for enhancement/ Where to go fishing 
†Access to the enhanced zone (EZ) was restricted when participants choose not to pay for the 
stock enhancement program (SEP).  
‡Collective harvesting occurred for those participants who chose to pay for the SEP, implying 
membership of a cooperative that exploits the EZ.  
 
The experimental fishery operated under an Individual Quota system (IQ) where the 
Total Allowable Catch (TAC) was divided into 24 quota units evenly allocated 
amongst eight participants per experimental session. Hence each participant was 
allocated a quota holding of three units that could be fished in one or both zones 
according to the participants’ decision, which was made at the beginning of every 
fishing season (or round), in each experimental session. Participants were allowed to 
communicate with each other before making their decisions, as cooperative actions 
can emerge from bargaining (Nash 1951). Participants thus made decisions within the 
bounds of the experimental factors (Table 5.1) and with reference to an expected 
payoff outcome, based on Cardenas (2000) (Appendix 5.1). This allowed participants 
to estimate their payoff based on their own decisions including agreements with other 
participants, whether they were to contribute to the SEP, and to the zone in which they 
would fish their quota units. The payoff was higher with more participants contributing 
to the SEP, provided they coordinated their fishing effort and allocated their quota 
optimally across both zones.  
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The maximum economic yield from the fishery was obtained if: (i) all participants 
contributed to the SEP; and (ii) catch was spread with 14 units in the EZ and 10 in the 
N-EZ.  This distribution of quota units led to unequal payoffs for each participant 
unless they took turns in reducing their catch from the more profitable EZ (this 
occurred when two of the eight participants allocated one of their three quota units into 
the EZ and two in the N-EZ, while the other six participants allocated two units in the 
EZ and one in the N-EZ). Individual participants could increase their payoff in any 
one round by putting more of their effort into the EZ but this would deplete the zone 
so that overall economic yield was reduced in the next fishing season.  Consequently, 
any deviation from the optimal scenario implied that one or more participants were 
choosing to not act in the interest of the whole group and not maximise the economic 
yield from the fishery. This behaviour was taken as participants following their Nash 
equilibrium strategies to maximize their individual payoff under the risk that others 
could also follow the same strategy (Nash 1950, 1951). These deviations could occur 
when participants decided to not cooperate and contribute to the SEP; or when they 
broke agreements around coordination of fishing effort so that there was a sub-optimal 
allocation of effort in one of the two zones (in terms of overall economic yield).     
   
Experimental procedures 
Experimental sessions were carried out in the University of Tasmania’s experimental 
computer laboratory between February and March 2013. For each treatment, four 
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independent sessions and 20 rounds per session were run. Each session lasted around 
90 minutes, including the initial time to read instructions (Appendix 5.2) and complete 
a multiple-choice quiz (Appendix 5.3) to ensure that all participants understood the 
instructions.  The experiment did not start until the participants were able to correctly 
answer the quiz. Upon completion of the experimental session participants were 
confidentially given cash payments based on the amount earned through the simulated 
fishery. Payments ranged from AUD$27 to AUD$45 (AUD$30 average), which 
included a participation payment of AUD$10.  The supplementary material includes 
an example of the instructions and the respective quiz supplied to participants before 
the start of the experiment. The experimental treatments were programmed in custom-
designed software. Participants were allowed to communicate with each other during 
the experiments using the built-in anonymous chat in the experimental software, verbal 
communication was prohibited. Record keeping involved non-disclosure of identity to 
ensure anonymity. 
 
Experimental participants 
Participants were recruited from students across the University of Tasmania campus 
who were invited to be part of a pool of experimental subjects. Eight individuals were 
randomly drawn from this pool for participation in each session. Using students for 
economic experiments has been focus of research to examine biases and external 
validity. The main concerns have been (i) the students’ behaviour may not represent 
the real actors’ behaviour in the real world (Levitt and List 2007; Falk et al. 2013); 
and (ii) self-selection, where students showing more pro-social preferences are more 
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prone to volunteer, introducing a bias toward to common-interest outcomes  (Murphy 
et al. 2003; Levitt & List 2012). The first of these biases is important for experiments 
where specific operational knowledge is required. However, the rapid training session 
and highly stylised fishery were aimed at safeguarding against this bias.  Optimal 
outcomes were not achieved by knowledge of fishing practices but by coordination 
with other participants instead. The experiment was thus focussed on a general human 
response, and students have been found to not deploy a significantly different 
behaviour than the general population, for example, in trust experiments (Exadaktylos 
et al. 2013).  
 
Regarding concerns of a self-selection bias, it has been shown that students who have 
participated in economic experiments do not show significantly more pro-social 
responses than students who have never participated; and those with pro-social 
inclinations are neither more likely to participate in experiments nor participate more 
frequently (Cleave et al. 2010; Falk et al. 2013). Similar results have been found in 
experiments with non-student participants, where volunteers do not significantly 
behave more pro-socially than non-volunteers (Bellemare and Kröger 2007; Anderson 
et al. 2013).  
 
Finally, it should be noted that this experiment was not designed to measure the actual 
quantitative level of self or common-interest behaviour treatments’ setting may lead 
to.  The intent of this research was to classify directions rather than magnitude and the 
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influence of different rules on participants’ behaviour.  This ability to qualitatively 
examine responses is considered one benefit of the laboratory experiment (Levitt and 
List 2007) although it is important to be cognisant of limitations when applying 
conclusions to real fisheries.  For example León et al. (in press) show that expected 
stewardship behaviour of fishers in real ITQ fisheries can fail in the presence of 
numerous unique factors.   
 
Statistical methods 
A Nash Decision Index (NDI) was calculated and compared across the treatments to 
assess the effectiveness of the overall cooperation and coordination to optimally 
allocate fishing effort and reduce economic rent dissipation (Nash behaviour). The 
NDI was the ratio between actual total profit and optimal total profit per round. 
Additionally, to better understand the participants’ behaviour reflected in the NDI, the 
number of participants paying for the SEP was compared across the different 
management structures to assess whether these provided sufficient incentives to 
initiate willingness to pay costs (willingness to pay).  
 
The extent to which participants showed either reciprocity or broke the agreed 
coordination of fishing effort was assessed across treatments (Trust and reciprocity 
model). To exercise trust and reciprocity participants should have agreed and 
undertaken turns in allocating only one quota unit in the EZ. Depending on how many 
participants paid for the SEP, there was an optimal average number of quotas per 
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participants to be fished in the EZ to reach the optimal economic yield. This optimal 
number of quotas was calculated for each treatment from the payoff table according to 
the number of participants who paid for the SEP (Appendix 5.4).To assess trust and 
reciprocity, the actual average number of units fished in the EZ was contrasted against 
these optimal numbers across the four treatments.  
 
To evaluate whether participants changed their behaviour through the 20 fishing 
seasons (rounds) of each session, the whole period of the sessions was split into three 
phases and the first and third were contrasted, relative to the variables described above: 
NDI; number of participants who paid for the SEP; and the index of trust and 
reciprocity based on distribution of quota units between zones.  
 
Analyses were conducted with three generalised estimating equation (GEE) models as 
described in (Emery et al. 2015). The modelling was performed using R (R Core Team 
2014) and the R package geepack (Højsgaard et al. 2006). The GEE modelling is 
suitable for longitudinal or panel data, which involves observations of multiple 
subjects’ outputs through time, which is often autocorrelated (Liang and Zeger 1986; 
Zeger and Liang 1986; Ballinger 2004). The GEE approach resolves this by estimating 
a coefficient to describe changes in the population mean (rounds), given changes in 
the covariates, rather than changes in the individual (participants) mean as occurs with 
Mixed models (Hubbard et al. 2010). In order to obtain a better estimate of the 
variance, and efficient and unbiased estimations of coefficients, a working correlation 
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structure is provided to address within population non-independence from correlation 
amongst participants (Diggle et al. 2002). A key strength of the GEE approach is that 
even if the working correlation structure is miss-specified, GEE provides robust 
estimations (Liang and Zeger 1986; Freedman 2006; Lai and Small 2007; Lalonde et 
al. 2013). Additionally, the GEE aproach is robust to non-normally distributed 
response variables (Harrison and Hulin 1989). 
 
Fitting a GEE model involves three steps (Ballinger 2004; Zuur et al. 2009): (i) 
specifying the systematic component and the link transformation function that relates 
the conditional mean and the systematic component (McCullagh and Nelder); (ii) 
specifying the response variable distribution, thus the variance may be calculated as a 
function of the mean response (Hardin and Hilbe 2003); and (iii) specifying the 
correlation structure of the responses amongst subjects nested within groups (rounds) 
(Liang and Zeger 1986). Covariates included in the NDI model here were treatment, 
session phase, payoff in the EZ and cumulative income. An interaction term treatment 
x session phase was included to determine whether participants changed their 
behaviour during sessions relative to both treatment and period of time. The log-link 
transformation function was used in each case; the gamma distribution was used for 
the NDI model and Poisson for the contribution and reciprocity models.  First order 
autoregressive structure (AR-1) was used as a working correlation because the 
participants’ behaviour was measured though time and the models fitted with this 
correlation structure showed the lowest Pan’s quasi-likelihood under the independence 
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model information criterion (QIC) score (Pan 2001; Pan and Connett 2002).  QIC was 
estimated using the R package QICpack (Hocking 2014). 
 
5.4. Results  
Rent dissipation 
The results of the Nash decision index (NDI) model showed that at the end of 
experimental sessions the user-pay systems for access to the EZ (treatments By-use A 
and B) had lower rent dissipation, with a significantly lower NDI, relative to the 
treatments Compulsory and Voluntary (Fig. 5.1, Table 5.2). The Voluntary treatment 
had a significantly higher NDI, and the highest rent dissipation. In other words, this 
treatment gave rise to self-interest rather than common-interest behaviour amongst 
participants. During the first 6 session of the total 20 experimental sessions, rent 
dissipation in the By-use A and B treatments were not significantly different to the 
treatment Compulsory (p=0.999 and p=0.978 respectively, Fig. 5.1 and Table 5.2). 
This meant that non-exclusive access to the EZ did not increase rent dissipation when 
it was combined with compulsory payment, in contrast to when non-exclusive access 
was combined with voluntary payment (p<0.001, contrast between Compulsory and 
Voluntary).  
 
The treatments Compulsory and Voluntary did not promote improvements in 
coordination of the distribution of fishing effort by participants’ while rounds were 
progressing, with no significant differences in the NDI between the first and last third 
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of sessions (p=0.878 and p=0.760, respectively). Conversely, rent dissipation 
progressively reduced with successive fishing seasons or rounds in the treatments By-
use A and B.  This was apparent because the NDI was significantly lower at the end of 
the session for both treatments (p=0.012 and p=0.002 respectively). These two 
treatments did not have significantly different NDI throughout the experimental 
sessions (p=0.994 and p=0.772, contrast between the first and last third of sessions 
respectively). This meant that under the current design, the profit pooling arrangement 
did not significantly improve the NDI compared to the system of exclusive access to 
the EZ with enhancement with by-use payments. 
 
Figure 5.1. Nash decision index across treatments during the first and last third of the 
experimental sessions (first and last six rounds respectively). Higher Nash decision 
index implies more self-interested decision making and higher rent dissipation. Bars 
represent the 95% confidence intervals. 
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Table 5.2. Pairwise contrast to assess differences in the Nash decision index amongst 
treatments during the first and last third of the experimental sessions (first and last six 
rounds respectively). 
Third of 
session Treatment contrast 
Estimate 
difference 
Std. 
Error z value Pr(>|z|) 
First Compulsory vs. Voluntary  0.116 0.027 4.36 <0.001 
 Compulsory vs. By-use A 0.004 0.024 0.15 0.999 
 Compulsory vs. By-use B 0.011 0.028 0.4 0.978 
 Voluntary vs. By-use A -0.112 0.027 -4.11 <0.001 
 Voluntary vs. By-use B -0.105 0.030 -3.54 0.002 
  By-use A vs. By-use B 0.007 0.028 0.26 0.994 
Last Compulsory vs. Voluntary  0.128 0.021 6.05 <0.001 
 Compulsory vs. By-use A -0.064 0.017 -3.83 <0.001 
 Compulsory vs. By-use B -0.077 0.015 -5.13 <0.001 
 Voluntary vs. By-use A -0.191 0.021 -9.24 <0.001 
 Voluntary vs. By-use B -0.205 0.020 10.52 <0.001 
  By-use A vs. By-use B -0.014 0.014 -0.95 0.772 
 
 
 
Willingness to pay  
Participants decisions whether to pay for the SEP were based primarily on the payoffs; 
however, decisions were also modulated by regulations included in each treatment.  
Despite highest payoffs occurring when all participants paid for the SEP, there were 
significant differences amongst treatments in the number of participants that opted to 
pay (Fig. 5.2, Table 5.3). The treatment Voluntary led to a significantly lower number 
of participants paying for the SEP in contrast with the treatments By-use A and B, and 
this pattern did not change as the sessions progressed (contrast between first and last 
third of sessions for both treatment respectively, Table 5.3). The treatment By-use A 
and B did not show significant differences in the number of participants paying for the 
SEP at any time of the sessions (Table 5.3). Also, under treatment By-use B, 
participants reacted to other participants behaviour through the rounds and their 
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willingness to pay for the SEP significantly increased (p=0.004, contrast between the 
first and last third of sessions).  
 
 
Figure 5.2. Number of participants paying for the stock enhancement program 
(willingness to pay) for voluntary and by-use treatments, during the first and last third 
of the experimental sessions (first and last six rounds respectively). Bars represent the 
95% confidence  
 
Table 5.3. Pairwise contrast to assess difference in the number of participants paying 
for the stock enhancement program amongst treatments, in the first and last third of 
the experimental sessions (first and last six rounds respectively). 
Third of 
session Treatment contrast 
Estimate 
difference 
Std. 
Error z value Pr(>|z|) 
First 
  
Voluntary vs. By-use A -0.203 0.047 -4.35 <0.001 
Voluntary vs. By-use B -0.159 0.048 -3.32 0.003 
By-use A vs. By-use B -0.044 0.030 -1.49 0.287 
Last 
  
Voluntary vs. By-use A -0.293 0.049 -5.93 <0.001 
Voluntary vs. By-use B -0.285 0.050 -5.74 <0.001 
By-use A vs. By-use B -0.008 0.005 -1.45 0.280 
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Trust and reciprocity 
In general terms, the treatments Compulsory and Voluntary did not lead participants 
to reach the optimal level of trust and reciprocity, with the average number of quota 
units fished in the EZ significantly higher than the optimal 1.75 units throughout the 
experimental sessions in both cases, meaning the zone became depleted (Fig. 5.3, 
Table 5.4). In contrast the treatments By-Use A and B resulted in the number of quota 
units fished in the EZ being in the optimal range of these two treatments (Fig. 5.3).  
 
 
Figure 5.3. Average number of quota units fished in the enhanced zone during the first 
and last third of the experimental sessions (first and last six rounds respectively). 
Dotted line represents the optimal number of quota units to be fished under each 
treatment (Compulsory: 1.75, By-use A and B: 1.75-1.80 and Voluntary: 1.50-1.75 
units). Bars represent the 95% confidence intervals. 
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Table 5.4. Contrast of actual quota units fished against the optimal number of quota 
units (1.9) to be fished in the enhanced zone for the first and last third of the 
experimental sessions (first and last six rounds respectively). 
Third of 
session treat 
Predicted 
value Difference 
Std. 
Error z value Pr(>|z|) 
First 
 
Compulsory 1.90 0.153 0.030 5.11 <0.001 
Voluntary 1.97 0.223 0.030 7.44 <0.001 
By-use A 1.85 0.053 0.024 2.23 0.013 
By-use B 1.67 -0.077 0.030 2.51 0.006 
Last 
 
Compulsory 1.93 0.175 0.023 7.66 <0.001 
Voluntary 2.05 0.298 0.019 15.41 <0.001 
By-use A 1.87 -0.020 0.020 0.98 0.164 
By-use B 1.75 -0.002 0.010 0.26 0.399 
 
 
5.5. Discussion 
Individual Transferable Quota (ITQ) systems have shown to reduce competition 
amongst fishers and have other desirable effects such as reducing over-capitalization. 
However, they do not necessarily resolve stock and congestion externalities that result 
from spatial stock heterogeneity (Boyce 1992). Coordination of fishing effort (Deacon 
and Costello 2008) and full delineation of quota allocation (e.g. assigning rights to 
cooperatives) (Deacon et al. 2008) have been suggested as mechanisms to overcome 
rent dissipation that may arise from heterogeneous stocks. Both mechanisms demand 
a great deal of trust and reciprocity by fishers if they are to succeed because they 
require cooperation (Fehr et al. 2002).  
 
Trust and reciprocity is required, because in social or economic exchanges not all 
aspects can be controlled with rules, consequently there is usually room for cheating. 
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In this context, voluntary co-operators (or strong reciprocators) and conditional co-
operators (or reciprocal altruists) arise. The first are those individuals willing to reward 
others for cooperation or punish them when not cooperative, even if this implies a cost. 
In contrast, the second are self-interested individuals who only will reward and punish 
if there is a reward (Gintis 2000a; Fischbacher et al. 2001; Gintis et al. 2001; Fehr et 
al. 2002; Fehr & Fischbacher 2003). The influence of these two kinds of individual 
depends on the environmental conditions (rules) that influence social or economic 
exchanges (Fehr et al. 2002; Fehr and Fischbacher 2003). In this study was found that 
participants were highly willing to coordinate fishing effort, reducing rent dissipation, 
when they had the option of voluntary payment for the SEP together with clear 
delineation of who could access to the EZ. On the other extreme, participants had less 
coordination of effort and higher rent dissipation when the payment for the SEP was 
voluntary and without delineation of who could harvest in the EZ. 
  
Cooperation, willingness to pay and rent dissipation 
Participants were not advised on the way how to maximize their incomes, but they 
could infer it from the payoff table which they were provided with. During the period 
that they had available to discuss strategies how optimally allocate their quotas, they 
were able to find the best solution. However, sometimes all or some of the participants 
did not follow the agreed strategy, which varied depending on the incentives provided 
for each treatment. 
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The Compulsory treatment had lower rent dissipation relative to other treatments and 
this remained constant throughout the sessions without any improvement. This lower 
rent dissipation was a consequence of cooperation amongst participants and fishing 
effort coordination. The influence of voluntary co-operators was challenged by the 
influence of conditional co-operators.  The latter group seemed to react to the 
perceived cost-benefit ratio of cheating and often behaved as free-riders, because the 
payment for the SEP was compulsory. Any deviation from the optimal level of 
cooperation implied costs that could be even higher than the revenues, and had to be 
paid by each participant. This cost acted like a punishment but controlled free-riding 
and promoted cooperation (Shinada and Yamagishi 2007). Self-interested participants 
alternately followed and broke the effort coordination agreement throughout sessions, 
which was reflected in fluctuating dissipation of rent. Compulsory payment had an 
implicit punishment when participants deviated from the effort coordination agreed, 
but even though this treatment signalled that cooperation was more profitable than 
free-riding, it was not the optimal treatment. 
 
The policy behind of the Compulsory treatment was based on pure financial incentive, 
the carrot and the stick, and there were no non-financial incentives such as self-
determination (Bowles 2008) or altruism (Fehr et al. 2002; Fehr and Fischbacher 
2003). To achieve good outcomes, participants only had to comply with the rules.  In 
contrast, under the treatments By-use A and B participants had the chance to choose 
whether or not to become involved in the SEP. Because this option implied acceptance 
of the enhancement cost, participants were more likely to be cooperative when they 
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participated in the SEP. Both treatments initially had a high level of compliance in 
coordination of effort. Some participants who were less prone to be cooperative or 
resistant to paying the cost of the SEP, kept themselves out the SEP. Thus, they could 
exercise their self-determination and took the option of not cooperating. As the 
sessions progressed, willingness to pay and also compliance increased, which may be 
the influence of cooperative individuals. This type of voluntary cooperation has shown 
positive correlation to trust, attitude to helpfulness and fairness of strangers (Gächter 
et al. 2004). Therefore, the rules of these two treatments (treatment setting) provided 
conditions for common-interested participants to lead the economic exchanges to a 
cooperative equilibrium, where free-riding was controlled.     
 
The treatments By-use A and B reached a similar level of cooperation and rent 
dissipation, basically because both treatments lead to cooperation providing exclusive 
access to the EZ. However, By-use B had the potential to further reduce rent dissipation 
as participants paid for the SEP as members of a cooperative. Cooperatives have the 
potential to reduce costs when they pool their fishing effort, through purchasing and 
selling power such as when buying supplies, and the removal of redundant vessels 
(Uchida and Baba 2008). These characteristics of cooperatives were not included in 
the simplified version of this treatment (By-use B) implemented in this experiment; 
however, it would be reasonable to expect lower rent dissipation, if cost had been 
pooled. There are examples where economic efficiency was increased by the 
introduction of cooperatives. In the Bering Sea Pollock fishery, the formation of 
Pollock Conservation Cooperative reduced cost and increased profitability by 
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coordinating both harvesting and processing activities over the space and time (Wilen 
and Richardson 2008). In Alaska, the Chignik Sockeye Salmon Cooperative increased 
economic efficiency by reducing costs and also by providing shared inputs (Deacon et 
al. 2008).            
 
In the Voluntary treatment, participants had low willingness to pay for the SEP and 
also low compliance with the effort coordination agreed amongst the group. There is 
known to be a relationship between expectations of cooperation and actual cooperative 
behaviour; higher expectations that others will cooperate will cause an individual to 
be more likely to be cooperative (Charness and Dufwenberg 2006). Under the 
Voluntary treatment, participants seemed to expect low cooperation from others, 
because there were no rules to provide any level of security that they would not be the 
‘fool’ exploited by free-riders. Also there was no mechanism to charge participants for 
cost involved when they cheated on others. A similar conclusion was made from an 
economic experiment that investigated the influence of communication and 
heterogeneity of operators in a fishery in solving an assignment problem. In the 
absence of a structure for punishing offenders, co-operators reacted by reducing 
cooperation or defecting (Emery et al. 2015) This was consistent with the findings 
from a study based on a model of criminal behaviour and a survey to fishing industry 
in a unrevealed zone in United Kingdom; the probability of violation of quota 
restrictions decreased when the perceived risk of detection and expected level of fine 
increased (Hatcher et al. 2000).      
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Individuals may also react to quality of the provided service or good in choosing 
whether to cooperate as higher benefits increase the willingness to pay  (Kanyoka et 
al. 2008; Snowball et al. 2008; Lee et al. 2014). Participants tended to allocate more 
effort into the EZ than was optimal and this behaviour was seen in the early sessions 
of the experiment.  This behavoiur exacerbated the fear of funding the SEP and then 
being exploited by free-riders. Therefore, willingness to pay in a Voluntary treatment 
seemed to be influenced by a combination of two factors: expectation about others 
willingness to pay; and potential returns.  
 
The influence of voluntary co-operators may drive others individuals to cooperate, to 
form social networks and may promote reciprocity and trustworthiness, all elements 
of social capital (Putman, 2000). This capital, contributed by voluntary co-operators, 
was not enough to encourage conditional co-operators to jointly reduce free-riding. It 
has been shown that rules were required to control extreme behaviour and provide the 
environment for cooperation (Clark et al. 2001; Fischbacher et al. 2001; Gächter et al. 
2004; Shinada & Yamagishi 2007). Therefore, lack of rules around location of effort 
meant that payment for the SEP was too risky and that cheating was not punished, thus 
self-interested participants dominated the environment leading to rent dissipation. 
 
In every treatment, examination of the digital communications between participants 
revealed peer pressure existed amongst participants when someone did not follow the 
agreed system for effort coordination. This factor was not include in the experimental 
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design; however, it has been described as a kind of nonmonetary punishment, often 
strong enough to control self-interested actors (Masclet et al. 2003).     
 
Trust and reciprocity 
Trust is based on expectations of reciprocity where the trustors’ decision involves 
aceptance of vulnerability (Evans and Krueger 2014). In the Voluntary treatment, 
players had low expectation of reciprocity. They avoided being vulnerable to free-
riding and a low average number of participants paid for the SEP. This behaviour has 
been also observed in Australian abalone fisheries where industry-led resource 
management initiatives where carried out, including increase of size limits, consensus 
planning of the distribution of fishing effort, closing areas, and TAC reduction 
(Gilmour et al. 2011). In three out of five fisheries low level of percieved trust was 
associated with a low belief about operators’ ability to cooperate. Lack of complaince 
in Swedish fisheries was highly discouraging to the complying fishers when offenders 
are not prosecuted, especially in cases when they confess the offence (Eggert and 
Ellegard 2003).  
  
Participants also did not show reciprocity, allocating a significantly higher number of 
quota units in the EZ than the optimal. Some participants tried to encourage trust and 
reciprocity while the sessions were progresing so that economic yield could be 
increased; however, they failed to reach the optimal distribution of effort and 
participation in the SEP. As has been reported in the literature (Evans and Krueger 
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2014), expectations of reciprocity were influenced by the level of temptation to cheat 
plus a lack of rules that would lead to free-riders being punished or blocked. 
Unfavourable outcomes from round to round provided a negative feedback that 
prevented even more development of trust-reciprocity, since trustors pay a great deal 
of attencion to their own outcomes when they make decisions to trust strangers (Evans 
and Krueger 2014).  
 
In the treatment By-use A and B, participants who were more prone to cooperate 
invested in the SEP, and initial outcomes were less affected by self-interested 
participants. Thus, from the beginning the outcomes were close to optimal, which was 
an incentive to trust and reciprocate in the following rounds. This was enhanced by 
repeated interactions, which increased cooperation between strangers (Andreoni & 
Miller 1993; Gächter & Falk 2002). Thus, given that trust relies on past behaviour 
(Resnick and Zeckhauser 2002), there was a positive feedback that reinforced trusting 
and reciprocating. However, the exclusive access to the EZ was fundamental to this 
result, considering that repeated interactions in the other treatments did not produce 
the same effect.     
 
In the context of ITQ-managed fisheries, quota owners are theoretically expected to 
behave as resource stewards as a result from economic incentives (Wilen 2006). 
However, this cannot be generalized when additional resource management initiatives 
are applied, such as stock enhancement. Operators are able to identify opportunities 
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for cheating (Fehr and Gächter 2002a) and it is difficult to design the right policy to 
control all aspects (Ostrom 1990); therefore, they cannot be exempted from developing 
trust and cooperation. In situations where the level of trust is low, fishers tend to ask 
for government regulations and enforcement of initiatives from industry (Gilmour et 
al. 2011). This may imply higher cost for fisheries and/or ineffectiveness of the 
management initiative as government fisheries agencies may be limited to monitor and 
inforce rules. Therefore, trust plays a role in reducing costs of fisheries enforcement 
(Pretty 2003; Grafton 2005), and the experimental economic approach provided a tool 
exploring the relative magnitude and direction of factors that lead to trust, reciprocity 
and cooperation. Management of fisheries may be thus assisted when cognisant of the 
design elements that create cooperative behaviour for better results from management 
initiatives.     
          
5.6. Conclusions 
Participants reacted differently according to the signals of different treatments and the 
behaviour of other participants as sessions were progressing.  The presence of a 
compulsory payment provided some security that self-interested participants were 
going to be controlled, which reduced vulnerability of cooperative participants and 
increased the expectation of reciprocity. However, punishment was insufficient to 
promote cooperation, and other conditions for self-determination were required. Thus, 
cooperation, trust and reciprocity reached the highest level when individuals had the 
option of choosing whether to participate in the management measure or not. This 
required a mechanism that spatially blocked the actions of self-interested individuals, 
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as was the case with the By-use treatments. Lack of trust and cooperation may increase 
fisheries management costs as higher level of monitoring and enforcement is required.  
The experimental economic approach provides a tool to assist management by 
providing information about factors that increase cooperative behaviour. 
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5.7. Appendices 
5.7.1. Appendix 5.1. Payoff table in experimental dollars.  
 
Cost of stock enhancement program was not included in this table, it was 
separately deducted ($10/player) 
  
Total N of 
supported 
quotas in the 
zone 
Enhanced Zone Non-
enhanced 
zone 
  
N° of people contributing to enhancement 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 
 
1 $20 $21 $30 $30 $33 $34 $36 $37 $40 $20 
2 $20 $21 $30 $30 $33 $34 $36 $37 $40 $20 
 
3 $20 $21 $30 $30 $33 $34 $36 $37 $40 $20 
Profit/q
u
ota
 
4 $20 $20 $22 $30 $33 $34 $36 $37 $40 $20 
5 $20 $20 $22 $30 $33 $34 $36 $37 $40 $20 
6 $15 $20 $22 $23 $33 $34 $36 $37 $40 $20 
7 $15 $20 $22 $23 $33 $34 $36 $37 $40 $20 
8 $15 $20 $22 $23 $25 $34 $36 $37 $40 $20 
9 $5 $20 $22 $23 $25 $34 $36 $37 $40 $20 
10 $5 $10 $22 $23 $25 $30 $36 $37 $40 $20 
11 $5 $10 $15 $23 $25 $30 $36 $37 $40 $15 
12 $0 $10 $15 $18 $25 $30 $30 $37 $40 $12 
13 $0 $0 $15 $18 $23 $30 $30 $37 $40 $9 
14 $0 $0 $5 $18 $23 $30 $30 $31 $40 $8 
15 $0 $0 $5 $8 $23 $30 $28 $31 $30 $8 
16 $0 $0 $0 $8 $15 $30 $28 $29 $30 $2 
17 $0 $0 $0 $0 $15 $22 $28 $29 $30 $2 
18 $0 $0 $0 $0 $7 $22 $22 $29 $30 $2 
19 $0 $0 $0 $0 $7 $22 $22 $27 $30 $2 
20 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $16 $16 $27 $27 $2 
21 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $16 $16 $21 $27 $2 
22 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $8 $10 $21 $21 $2 
23 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $8 $10 $15 $21 $2 
24 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $4 $9 $15 $2 
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5.7.2. Appendix: Example instructions to participants 
 
About this experiment 
If you follow the instructions and make sound decisions, based on the information 
you are provided with, you may earn money that will be paid to you in cash at the 
end of the session. 
 
What to do: 
1. Read through the instructions carefully.  
2. After reading the instructions, you will be taken to a short quiz that will test 
your comprehension of the instructions.  
3. Correctly answering ALL of the quiz questions will give you a unique 
password that you can use to login to the experiment. 
 
Overview of this experiment 
The framework of this experiment is a rock lobster fishery under a quota management 
system. It implies that every fisher involved in the fishery is allocated with a number 
of fishing quota units. Every quota unit allows a specific amount (kg) of lobsters to be 
caught. For the purpose of this experiment it is not relevant how many kilograms of 
lobster are attached to each quota. What is relevant, is that every fished quota has 
associated a payoff that varies according a number of conditions.  
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In this fishery’s context there is a stock enhancement program (SEP), which 
involves translocation of rock lobster from zones where the fishing effort is negligible 
to other zone where the fishing effort is higher. As a result of the translocation two 
zones are generated, labelled as Enhanced Zone (EZ) and Non-Enhanced Zone (N-
EZ). In this context, the experiment is concerned with the way people make decisions 
about where to go fishing and the associated impacts on their payouts in the future.  
 
You are one of eight participants (fishers) allocated with three fishing quota units; 
therefore, in the whole fishery there are 24 quota units. Each participant has to make 
decisions about whether or not to pay to fund the SEP. You are allowed to fish in 
both the EZ and the N-EZ regardless you decided pay or not for the SEP.  
 
Using the chat system implemented in the experimental software you will be able to 
communicate with other participants.  All communication with other players must be 
with this system, no other forms of communication are allowed. There will be a 
number of rounds and during the course of each one you have to make these 
decisions.  
 
The SEP entirely depends on the industry funding and it is voluntary. This means 
that each participant may choose or not to pay $10 to contribute to the SEP. 
Each participant can also choose in which area to allocate each one of the 
fishing quotas units (three). It implies that each one allowed to fish in the EZ, even 
if someone has not contributed to fund the SEP.  
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The payoff in the EZ gradually increases while the number of participants 
contributing to the SEP also increases. In both the EZ and the N-EZ there is a 
maximum number of quotas that return a maximum payoff, but once it is 
exceeded the payoff gradually decreases. There is an optimal number of quotas 
to be allocated in each zone that gives a maximum profit for each participant and 
the whole fishery. Each participant individually harvests his/her quotas. 
 
In each round: 
 You need to decide whether or not you will contribute for the SEP. You will 
have to make your decision in 30 secs. 
 Once you decided contribute or not to the SEP, you are allowed to 
communicate with other players to discuss where allocate the quota units. You 
must use the chat software and you will have 90 secs to chat. 
 Once you have chatted with the other players, you have to allocate your quotas 
in the EZ and/or N-EZ. You will have 30 secs to allocate your quotas. 
 You individually harvest your quotas, accumulating the proceeds of each 
round. 
 There will be a number of rounds. 
A summary of the experiment is outlined in this flowchart: 
Chapter 5                   Experimental analysis of effort coordination to reduce ret dissipation 
 
140 
 
 
At the Start 
Once you have successfully completed the quiz, you will be taken to the login screen 
where you will enter your Player Number (provided to you by the instructor) and 
Password (obtained when you successfully complete the quiz).  
 
 
Once you have entered your Player Number and Password you will see the main 
experiment screen, as follows: 
 
Start
Contribute to 
enhancement?
(30 sec)
Choose how many 
quotas fish in:
(30 sec)
Yes No
EZ N-EZ
Chat with other 
players
(90 sec)
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By clicking on the “information” tab you can access information about your choices. 
You can choose from the following menu selections: 
 
Decision Table: This table provide you with:  
 Information on the payment you will receive based on: 
 How many participants contributed to the SEP and  
  Total number of quotas that you and others allocated in each zone (EZ 
and N-EZ). 
 The maximum number of quotas that give the maximum payment in each 
zone. 
 The payoff reduction when the maximum number of quotas that return a 
maximum payoff is exceeded. 
   
 
Income Table: This table provides you with information for each round about: 
 Whether or not you chose to contribute to the SEP. 
 Where you allocated your quotas, in the EZ and/or N-EZ. 
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 Where the group (including you) allocated its quotas. 
 The round payoff per zone. 
 Your round income.  
 Your total income. 
 
Chat Panel 
 
Once you have successfully completed the quiz, you will also be able to access the 
chat system for the experiment through this log-in screen. Enter your Player Number 
(provided to you by the instructor) and click the Submit button.  
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Once you have entered your Player Number you will see the chat window as follows: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In order to send a message, click on the text bar at the bottom of the window and 
type your message. Then click the Send button. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
During the experiment, you will ONLY be allowed to communicate through the chat 
software. Verbal communication is not allowed. Please comply with this rule to avoid 
confusion and wasting time. Please note that you will only be able to chat with other 
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participants during the decision period when the administrator (Player 9) notifies 
you that the chat window is open for communication through the message "Start chat" 
which will appear in your chat window and when the chat window is closed for 
communication the message "End chat" will appear. It is only during this period that 
you will be able to communicate with other participants. 
 
Your message is prefaced with your Player Number, as shown above. Message 
history is shown in the chat window.  
 
IMPORTANT NOTE: during the experiment your chat must confirm with the 
University Codes of Conduct. You cannot give any indication of your identity.  
 
Decision Table 
Clicking on the “DECISION TABLE” information tab in the main experiment screen 
will show you a table as in the screenshot below. This table shows the payoff per 
quota according to the total number of quotas that all participants (including 
you) allocate in each zone. Each participant has to decide whether or not contribute 
to the SEP, and then the whole group may discuss where everyone will allocate the 
quotas. 
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In order to make your decision you have to proceed like this: 
 
- By knowing how many players will contribute to the SEP you will know what 
payoff column in the EZ you need to use (columns “0” to “8”, see the screen 
shot below).  
- talking with other players you will know how many quotas will be allocated 
in each zone; therefore, you will know what row in the “quotas” column you 
have to use in each case.  
- Intersecting the selected row and column you will able to know the payoff per 
quota in the EZ. 
- To know the payoff per quota in the N-EZ you can proceed in a similar way. 
From the discussion with the other participants you will know how many 
quotas the group will allocate in the N-EZ. Therefore, you will know what 
row in the “quotas” column you have to use and intersect with the “N-EZ” 
column. 
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An example is shown below to illustrate how to use this table. 
 
EXAMPLES ONLY: 
Suppose that the players make the following decisions: 
- Four players chose to contribute to the SEP. 
- Five players chose to allocate two quotas in the EZ and one in the N-EZ. 
- Three players chose to allocate one quota in the EZ and two in the N-EZ. 
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Then, the group’s quota allocation is: 
�ࢆ = ͷ ݌݈�ݕ�ݎ ∗ ʹ ݍݑ݋ݐ�ݏ݌݈�ݕ�ݎ + ͵ ݌݈�ݕ�ݎݏ ∗ ͳ ݍݑ݋ݐ�݌݈�ݕ�ݎ = ͳ͵ ݍݑ݋ݐ�ݏ 
 � − �ࢆ = ͷ ݌݈�ݕ�ݎ ∗ ͳ ݍݑ݋ݐ�ݏ݌݈�ݕ�ݎ + ͵ ݌݈�ݕ�ݎݏ ∗ ʹ ݍݑ݋ݐ�݌݈�ݕ�ݎ = ͳͳ ݍݑ݋ݐ�ݏ 
 
If you see the “quotas” column in the table and search the row “13” and you intersect 
it with the column “4” (four players contributing) you will see that the payoff is 
$23/quota. If you search row “11” you will see that the payoff in the “N-EZ” column 
is $12/quota.  
 
Income Table 
Clicking on the “INCOME TABLE” information tab in the main experiment screen 
will for each round show you (see the screen shot below):  
- Whether or not you contribute to the SEP. 
- Number of people (including you) contributing to the SEP. 
- Where you allocated your quota units. 
- Where the whole group (including you) allocated the total number of quota 
units (24). 
- The payoff per zone, in experimental dollars. 
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- The income you received from your decision minus $10 by enhancement cost 
paid, in case you paid for that (“Your round income”), in experimental 
dollars. 
- The payment you will receive per round in Australian dollars ("Your player 
income"). 
- At the top of the table, “Player’s Total Income” will show you your 
accumulated income in Australian dollars. It is the initial AU$10 plus player 
income per round. 
Each experimental dollar is worth AU$0.0241. See the example below to understand 
how this table operates. 
 
Values in the table are only an example 
 
EXAMPLES ONLY: 
Following the previous example, players (including you) allocated a total of 13 
quotas in the EZ and 11 in the N-EZ, which is reflected in the income table (see the 
screen shot above). Four players chose to contribute to the SEP and one of them was 
you. From the decision table the round payoff is $23 and $12 for the EZ and N-EZ 
respectively, which also is reflected in the income table (see the screen shot above).  
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Suppose you were one of those players who allocated two quotas in the EZ and one 
in the N-EZ (see the screen shot above). Therefore: 
�ࢇ࢛࢔ࢊ �࢔ࢉ࢕࢓ࢋ = ʹ ݍݑ݋ݐ�ݏ ∗ $ʹ͵ݍݑ݋ݐ� + ͳ ݍݑ݋ݐ� ∗ $ͳʹݍݑ݋ݐ�= $ͷ8 − $ͳͲሺ�݊ℎ�݊��݉�݊ݐ �݋ݏݐሻ = $Ͷ8 �࢒ࢇ�ࢋ� �࢔ࢉ࢕࢓ࢋ = $Ͷ8 ∗ Ͳ.ͲʹͶͳ = ��$ͳ.ͳ͸ �࢕࢚ࢇ࢒ �࢒ࢇ�ࢋ� �࢔ࢉ࢕࢓ࢋ = ��$ͳͲ + ��$ͳ.ͳ͸ = ͳͳ.ͳ͸ 
 
Note that you do not need to calculate your income; it will be automatically 
calculated for you. 
 
Procedure 
Step 1 – Making a decision about contributing or not to the SEP 
For each round in the experiment you will be asked whether you will contribute or 
not to the SEP (see screenshot below). In order to make a decision, you will have to 
enter “1” if yes, you will contribute; and “2” if not, you will not contribute.  You will 
have 30 seconds to make this decision. 
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Step 2 – Coordination with other players where allocate the quota units 
Once you have decided whether or not contribute you will have the chance to 
communicate with other participants through the chat software available (see the 
screen shot below). You can see how many participants (including you) decided to 
contribute to the SEP clicking on the “Income Table” tab. This is your chance to talk 
with other players to try to optimally allocate your quota units in the EZ and/or the N-
EZ. You will have 90 seconds to chat. 
  
 
 
Step 3 – Making a decision about where allocate the quota units 
Also you will be asked to make a decision regarding the number of quota that you 
will allocate in each zone. You must enter an appropriate value in each zone in such 
a way that the total must be three. This is to say that you can fish in one zone 0, 1, 
2 or 3 quotas and in the other you necessarily have to fish 3, 2, 1 or 0 
respectively. In order to have the decision table on the screen you need click on the 
“Decision Table” tab. You will have 30 seconds to make this decision. 
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Step 4 – Review decisions and income earnings 
On the conclusion of the decision period, your income table will be updated with a 
summary of both your and the group’s fishing decision, number of allocated quotas 
in both zones, payoff per zone, your round income and total income. 
 
Step 5 - Repeat of Steps 1-4 
A number of rounds will be conducted. Decisions are only valid in the current round. 
The decision table will be the same in each round.  
 
Step 6 – Conclusion of experiment 
IMPORTANT: At the conclusion of the experiment you will be paid in cash the 
sum of the income you earned each round in addition to the turn up fee of AUD 
$10. 
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Experimental Rules 
Before you start the quiz you are being paid to participate in this experiment. 
Failure to comply with these rules will result in the forfeiture of earnings from 
this session and you will not be allowed to participate in future sessions. 
 
1. Talking is not permitted during the experiment: You can ONLY communicate 
with other players using the chat software. 
2. You must not identify yourself when communicating using the chat software. 
When communicating you must conform to the University’s code of conduct. 
In particular you must communicate in a manner that is free from harassment 
and discrimination. 
3. Only the experiment windows are permitted to be open during the experiment: 
You are not permitted to operate other software such as email or internet during 
the experiment 
4. You may ask questions of the instructor during the experiment  
 
Instructors can answer questions about procedures but cannot provide you with 
advice about decisions or trading. You must make decisions and develop strategies 
by yourself. 
 
Now that you have read the instructions – please click on the quiz located on your 
desktop. 
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5.7.3. Appendix 5.2. Example of quiz to participants 
 
The quiz uses the following decision table: 
 
Question 1 How many quotas will I be allocated? 
 A. 3 
 B. 6 
 C. 9 
Your answer:   
  
Question 2 How many quotas are there in the whole fishery? 
 A. 16 
 B. 24 
 C. 48 
Your answer:   
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Question 3 If I choose to contribute to the enhancement program 
and I fish three quota in the N-EZ, how many quotas do I 
have to fish in the EZ? 
 A. 0 
 B. 2 
 C. 3 
Your answer:   
 
  
Question 4 If I choose to contribute to the enhancement program 
and fish one quota in the EZ, how many quotas do I have 
to fish in the N-EZ? 
 A. 3 
 B. 2 
 C. 1 
Your answer:   
  
 If I choose to contribute to the enhancement program 
and I fish two quotas in the EZ and one in the N-EZ Question 5 
 How much do I have to pay for the enhancement 
program? 
 A. $5 
 B. $10 
 C. $15 
Your answer:   
  
Question 6 If I choose not to contribute to the enhancement 
program, can I fish any of my quotas in the EZ? 
 A. Yes 
 B. No 
Your answer:   
  
Question 7 What is the maximum number of quotas that the group 
should allocate in the EZ to obtain the maximum payoff 
per quota, if 5 people are paying for the enhancement 
program?  
 
 A. 22 
 B. 15  
 C. 9 
Your answer:   
  
 What is the maximum number of quotas that the group 
should allocate in the N-EZ to obtain the maximum 
payoff? 
Question 8 
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 A. 16 
 B. 12 
 C. 10 
Your answer:   
  
 How much is the payoff per quota if 4 players choose to 
pay for the enhancement program and they allocate 16 
quotas in the EZ? 
Question 9 
 A. $23 
 B. $15 
 C. $7 
Your answer:   
  
Question 10 How much is the payoff per quota if 0 players choose pay 
for the enhancement program and they allocate 8 quotas 
in the EZ? 
 
 A. $15 
 B. $5 
 C. $ 0 
Your answer:   
 
  
Question 11 How much is the payoff per quota if the group allocate 15 
quotas in the N-EZ?  
 A. $9 
 B. $8 
 C. $2 
Your answer:   
 
  
Question 12 How much is the payoff per quota if the group allocate 13 
quotas in the N-EZ? 
 A. $15 
 B. $12 
 C. $9 
Your answer:   
  
Question 13 If 4 players chose pay for the enhancement program and 
the quota unit allocation was: 
  
 
 
 
 
  
  
Operator 
Quota allocation 
EZ N-EZ 
Group (including you) 10 14 
You 2 1 
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Question 13.1 How much is the payoff per quota in the EZ? 
 A. $15 
 B. $25 
 C. $33 
Your answer:   
  
Question 13.2 How much is the payoff per quota in the N-EZ? 
 A. $12 
 B. $10 
 C. $8 
Your answer:   
  
Question 13.3 How much will I earn in the EZ?  4 player paid for the 
enhancement program and one of them was you ($10 
cost) 
 A. $50 
 B. $40 
 C. $30 
Your answer:   
  
Question 13.4 How much will I earn in the EZ?  4 player paid for the 
enhancement program and I did not paid for that. 
 A. $40 
 B. $50 
 C. $65 
Your answer:   
  
Question 13.5 How much will I earn in the N-EZ? 
 A. $8 
 B. $10 
 C. $15 
Your answer:   
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5.7.4. Appendix 5.4. Optimal allocation of quotas in the enhanced zone 
 
 
 Number of participants 
who paid for SEP  
Optimal quota 
allocation limits 
Type of payment  Minimum Maximum   Minimum Maximum 
Compulsory  - 8  - 1.87 
By-use A and B  5 8  1.63 1.87 
Voluntary  2 8  0.75 1.87 
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6.1. A thesis overview 
The aim of this thesis was to quantitatively assess the performance of Individual 
Transferable Quota (ITQ) systems in meeting economic and social objectives by 
analysing fishers’ behaviour and how it changed with variation in stock biomass. 
Firstly, this aim was addressed in the chapter two by exploring the TAC setting process 
in several ITQ managed costal fisheries in Australia and New Zealand. This involved 
analysis of whether the TACs were conservatively set to maximize profits as expected 
according to the economic theory around ITQs (Wilen 2006). These fisheries generally 
had histories that reflected good stewardship of resources, especially when fisher 
associations involved strong leadership who were supportive and able to drive 
decisions to stewardship. However, a non-trivial number of fisheries consistently 
showed lack of stewardship, setting TACs at levels that led fisheries to rent dissipation. 
Several factors were identified preventing stewardship, such as lack of understanding 
or acceptance of the rationale behind of ITQ systems. Fishers often considered the 
TAC to be a sustainability mechanism, misunderstanding its economic nature. 
Therefore, as soon as stock rebuilt, they lobbied for higher TAC, focusing on revenues 
rather than the higher profit that results from lower costs from higher catch rates. Lack 
of stewardship was also associated with heterogeneity of industry members’ interests. 
For instance, some quota owners had a high discount rate as they needed immediate 
cash flow or were planning to exit the fishery. Sometimes the voting systems included 
non-quota owners, who do not benefit from the maximization of asset values and this 
structure contributed to lack of stewardship in TAC setting. It was concluded that 
implementation of ITQs does not ensure stewardship for resources. Additional 
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conditions are required to reach this objective, otherwise, industry will continue to 
exhibit behaviours that ITQ systems supposedly eliminate. Therefore, it is 
fundamental that the mechanism that ITQs use to provide benefits are well understood 
by quota owners and managers. ITQ designs also need to recognise situations where 
stewardship will struggle to emerge in many situations, for instance, when the industry 
is dominated by operators who do not get benefits from the increase of market values 
and instead they profit form large catch (e.g. lease fishers and processors). Therefore, 
factors that may promote or eliminate good steward behaviour need to be considered 
when designing management systems and there can’t be a blanket assumption that 
ITQs will produce positive outcomes. 
 
In chapter three, changes in the permanent and temporary quota trade in the Tasmanian 
rock lobster fishery quota market were examined, during periods of both increasing 
and decreasing stock abundance. The Tasmanian rock lobster stock went through a 
period of stock rebuilding with biomass and catch rates increasing following the 
introduction of the ITQ system in 1998 until 2006. During a second period, the stock 
biomass decreased as a result of low recruitment (Linnane et al. 2010a), the TAC was 
under-caught and catch rate and quota lease price dropped (Gardner et al. 2011). The 
permanent quota trade was more active during the period of stock growth than during 
the period of stock decline. Quota owners appeared to increase their ownership due to 
expectations of higher rents, signalled by higher catch rates and quota prices. Thus 
they increased their scale of operation and/or become income supplementers or 
investors. The results also revealed that permanent transfer of quotas was not linked 
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with quota owners’ technical efficiency, instead it was driven by the financial capacity 
and to a lower degree by level of operations.  
 
Disparate financial capacity is a driver in quota transfers and may lead to 
concentration. For instance, in the Icelandic cod fishery there was an unequal 
distribution of quota units, with units becoming concentrated in a small number of 
large companies. Small-scale vessel owners that still held units gradually needed to 
enter into contracts to fish for large quota owners (Pálsson and Helgason 1995). 
Financial capacity may also alter the expected transition of quotas to more technically 
efficient operators taking the form of vertical integration when, for instance, processor 
or bait suppliers are quota owners (Brandt and McEvoy 2006; Pinkerton and Edwards 
2009). Also, exiting the fishery was associated with financial capacity rather than the 
technical efficiency as is theoretically expected with ITQs. 
 
Variation in the stock biomass also affected the activity of the quota lease market, 
which increased during the period of stock increase but remained stable during the 
period of stock decline. It appeared that operators with a lower financial capacity and 
bargaining power were able to take advantage of a less competitive market during the 
stock decline period to expand their business (competition amongst operators to lease 
quota reduced because catch rates declined, so more fishing days were required to take 
the catch). An economic experiment showed that lease quota dependant fishers value 
resources differently to quota owners, because of different financial (Emery et al.in 
press). This experiment included a temporal fishery closure as a measure to solve 
assignment problems leading to rent dissipation. The temporal closure was less 
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effective when the experimental fishery was dominated by lease quota dependant 
fishers, relative to when the fishery was dominated by quota owners. Therefore, it was 
concluded that decisions of lease quota fishers were influenced by their insecurity of 
tenure and lower profit as a result of the cost of leasing quota. This result was 
consistent with the current research where there was no link between operators’ 
technical efficiency and amount of leased-in quota in the quota lease market (in 
contrast to the quota sale market). In conclusion, temporary and permanent quota 
markets are complex and affected by both trends in stock and also financial capacity 
of operators.  As a result the theoretical trend of increasing efficiency in the fleet may 
not occur.  
 
In chapter four, the connection amongst operators trading in the quota lease market 
was explored through a social network analysis approach. Variations in the quota lease 
trade network were also analysed in the context of changes in stock biomass. Social 
networks are a component of social capital and may be assessed by statistical network 
indicators. In this research the influence of fishing operational factors (level of catch, 
ownership etc.) on the operator’s social capital was explored; and the influence of this 
capital on the market functionality measured by owned/leased quota balance and profit 
obtained by operators was also analysed. The structure and dynamic of the quota lease 
network changed with trends in the stock biomass. Operators increased their trading 
activity with an increase in the number and complexity of connections during the 
period of stock growth. This outcome appeared to result from the high catch and profit 
expectation signals delivered by a constraining TAC and higher lease prices. The trend 
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of increasing complexity in the network persisted for the two first years of stock 
decline. It appeared that many operators, especially those more reliant on leasing, took 
the opportunity to expand their level of operation during this less competitive market 
with lower quota price. Expansion of ownership during periods of stock decline was 
also observed in the Queensland coral reef fin-fish fishery on the Great Barrier Reef. 
After a reduction in landings, the demand for leased quota decreased, but the market 
structure changes were not uniform relative to operators’ category. Well-connected 
operators mainly reduced their number of lease-in connections because lease 
dependant operators were able to have their needs met by a smaller number of leasers-
out.  
 
 As higher effort and lower catch reduces profits, lease dependant operators responded 
to decreased stock biomass when the TAC became non-constraining. Networking of 
operators varied, with active operators that had higher catch developing greater linked 
networks for leasing in quota units. In contrast, investors and those operators not 
fishing at full capacity while still having high quota ownership had a high level of 
connections with well-connected operators. This network influenced the market 
functionality: active operators successful in increasing their profit by increasing their 
activity during the period of stock growth were less connected with well-connected 
operators. In contrast, investors tended to rely on a smaller number of well-connected 
operators. It appeared that the operators’ quota lease trade activity was influenced by 
their financial capacity which led to different responses to temporal changes in stock 
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productivity. Thus, market functionality involved an interplay between the financial 
success of active operators and investors and the stock status.   
 
In the chapter five, an economic experimental approach was used to assess the 
potential for cooperative behaviour to reduce effort congestion in ITQ systems with 
the added complexity of a stock enhancement program (SEP). Because ITQ systems 
do not fully delineate where fishers may harvest their quotas, they will concentrate 
their effort in the most profitable patches. The experimental design included four 
treatments combining three types of payments for the SEP with either open or 
exclusive access to the enhanced zone (EZ).  Income was either individually paid or 
equally distributed amongst participants as occurs in cooperatives. The results of the 
experiment showed different levels of fishing effort coordination according to the 
different incentives delivered by each of the treatments. For instance, the treatment 
that included voluntary payment together with open access led to a high level of free-
riding in contrast with the treatment where the payment was compulsory. Regulations 
around payment allowed participants in the experiment to develop trust and 
reciprocity. Treatments that included a by-use payment combined with exclusive 
access to the EZ reached higher levels of trust and reciprocity and thus were most 
effective in preventing dissipation of economic rent. In these treatments there was no 
significant difference in the level of cooperation when the factor of sharing-income 
was included. Some real world complexity of cooperatives such as sharing of fishing 
activities was not included in this experiment to ensure participants could have a good 
understanding of the design before making decisions. Therefore, real world incentives 
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from cooperation could be expected to be greater than in this experiment. Differences 
in cooperation between conditions of lease quota dependant dominated fisheries and 
quota owner dominated fishery disappeared when income sharing was enabled.  In the 
context of ITQs, it was shown that stewardship promoted from the economic 
incentives cannot be generalized when additional resource management initiatives are 
applied (e.g. stock enhancement). Regulations cannot control all aspects and where 
there is opportunity for cheating, operators will identify these (Fehr and Gächter 
2002a); therefore, incentives to develop trust and reciprocity amongst operators are 
required. Management of fisheries is thus assisted by understanding factors that lead 
operators to develop attributes of trust and reciprocity and could affect the design of 
management systems for better results. The experimental economic approach provided 
a tool for exploring the relative magnitude and direction of the effect of resource 
management initiatives.              
 
This thesis emphasised the outcome of ITQ systems in management of marine 
resources will vary according to differences amongst fisheries and amongst operators’ 
business structure within those fisheries. Management objectives are most likely to be 
met when there is consideration of operators’ behaviour, as was shown for the case for 
stewardship promotion by ITQs. Similarly, the reaction of operators varied according 
to their business characteristics and to stock biomass changes.  Understanding these 
could refine the design of ITQ systems to avoid rent dissipation. Finally, achieving 
fishery objectives with ITQ management involved more than pure economic 
incentives with factors such as trust and cooperation also important.    Understanding 
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these factors is especially important when resource management decisions are initiated 
and/or controlled by the industry, as can occur in co-management systems.  
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